Expanded Toolbar - Grog

[Didz]

I agree with Darkrob. Nor would it be particularly accurate historically.

I'm also dubious about the extended range of canister. Whilst its historically accurate that canister (particularly heavy canister) could carry farther than normally programmed into computer games there is little evidence that historically it was fired at anything like its potential range in battle.

The reasons for this are many and varied, but from a purely human angle batteries tended to view canister as a projectile of last resort. It was used at close range to protect the battery from being overrun or to deliver the coup de gras to extremely tempting targets such as infantry squares.

Other reasons based on various testimonials:
1) Limited visibility.
2) Excessive spread reducing effect.
3) Intervening friends or obstacles. e.g.the risk of friendly fire given points #1 & #2
4) Damage to the barrel of the gun.
5) Limited availability.
6) Conservation for a crisis.

The French artillery mention a concept they called 'The Mad Minute'(in French of course). This was triggered by the announcement of a crisis (perhaps the battery was coming under direct assault) and resulted in a frantic short term increase in the firepower of a battery in which canister would be employed and the guns fired without going through the full loading process of running the guns forward to their marks. It was reckoned that this would double the normal rate of fire for a battery and expend its entire local stock of canister and grape etc. But would leave the battery exhausted and ineffective for some time afterwards.

The British do not mention an equivalent by name, but anyone who has read Mercers journal will be familiar with the sketch showing the final positions of the guns from his battery by the end of the battle and recognise that at some point his gunners must have gone through a similar 'mad minute' event, possibly on several occasions during the multiple assaults on their position which resulted in the guns ending up in a confuse huddle on the reverse slope of the ridge.

[mcaryf]

Hi Reb, Rob and Didz
Thank you for your various replies. I am pleased at least to have generated a little bit of discussion even if none of you really agree with me.

To respond to the points about skirmishers - I understand Reb to say that he does not know how he would get a Brigade level command for getting each Btn. to create a skirmish unit. That is a good argument so I will experiment using his suggestion of switching a Brigade into various stances and see if that has my desired effect of rapidly creating several skirmisher units without creating too many undesired effects! Looking at Rob's doubts about the historical validity of having skirmisher units operating some way off from the parent unit. I suggest you consider the garrison of La Haye Sainte. These were actually skirmish companies spun off from the 2nd KGL Light Battalion and were operating far in front of their parent unit with the intention of breaking up any French attack. Probably for purely game mechanics reasons these 3 units are treated as if they are tiny battalions rather than skirmishers. similarly the 95th rifles unit in the sandpit was in reality a couple of Companies from the 1st Btn. Again I assume for game implementation reasons the rest of the battalion which historically was over the ridge behind Rogers' Battery has been omitted from the battle. For D'Erlons' attack some historians have estimated that 20% or more of his strength came forward as skirmishers in front of the advancing columns. Thus from a historic perspective there is nothing wrong in skirmishers operating several hundred yards away from their parent nor in there being large numbers of skirmishers deployed. I do agree that that the AI in some standard scenarios can be rendered ineffective by turning back artillery which you know is coming but that could be rectified relatively easily by the designers building in more variants to the approaches used by attacking forces and setting up escort units to guard artillery and repeat orders for the artillery to move in case it has been diverted.

Coming to the question of canister and my request for an order on the tool bar for the battery commander to be able to select munition type. There is the standard command Asetammo:canister which will do this so I would have thought it would not be a problem to add it to the toolbar. i would also have thought that it would be well within the normal command duty for a battery commander to tell his troops what ammunition to use as well as what target to select.

The topic of the effective range of canister is a popular one on many internet forums but there cannot be any real doubt that the game's standard limit of 200 yards is well below what it really was. The fact that the French and others developed two types of canister (heavy and light) with heavy typically being used at ranges about 200 yards longer than light clearly demonstrates that a total limit of 200 yards is inappropriate. I do not expect or ask the designers to change it because it does have an impact on other design decisions e.g. the strange choice to have to shoot people out of buildings rather than the historic forcing of doors and windows. I personally would like the facility for a battery commander to select munitions because I have a mod that extends the standard range of canister, but, even disregarding whether increased range is desirable, I think it is a command that historically should be available at battery level in the standard game.

Finally to address some of Didz's point about visibility - if that was limited by smoke etc and I was a battery commander thinking the enemy might be approaching I would be more inclined to fire some canister into the smoke than a round shot. Mark Adkin in the Waterloo Companion estimated that the French Grand Battery had about 3,000 rounds of canister ammunition available to it so I do not think it would have needed to have been conserved if they had been given a decent chance to use it.

This is a link to an interesting article by historian Nick Lipscombe about the development of Shrapnel which also discusses the effectiveness of Case shot,
http://www.nick-lipscombe.net/Shrapnel% ... 0Paper.pdf

Regards

Mike

[DarkRob]

Sometimes it isn't about what happened historically. Sometimes it's just about what works best for the game. There is no doubt that in the games current state skirmishers are overpowered. I've proved it time and time again. And the overpowered aspect is largely based on the sheer numbers of skirmishers you can kick out, and then being able to send them anywhere. I'm no history expert, and maybe skirmishers were used like that sometimes. It still doesn't change the fact that it's broken in game because the AI wasn't designed to have any real anwser to that level of skirmisher abuse. So creating a brigade level command to kick out skirmishers to abusive levels even faster doesn't seem to me to be the way to go as far as game balance goes.

Sometimes what happened historically doesn't always translate well to a video game. A 750 yard canister range in this game seems extreme to me, especially given the level of havock I'm able to raise with artillery at the standard 200 yard canister range in the game. Three times that distance? My Lord, my artillery would rule the world.

[RebBugler]

Coming to the question of canister and my request for an order on the tool bar for the battery commander to be able to select munition type. There is the standard command Asetammo:canister which will do this so I would have thought it would not be a problem to add it to the toolbar. i would also have thought that it would be well within the normal command duty for a battery commander to tell his troops what ammunition to use as well as what target to select.

Regards

Mike

Sorry, misread your post, thought you were requesting an EVERYTHING CANISTER button, thus my initial reply.

Sure, officer level 'Change Munitions' commands can be added to the toolbar. Frankly, they were scheduled to be added long ago but at that time spaces available on the toolbar were gone and I just plain forgot to address this later. When I get around to this, I'm busy with another project presently, I plan on including the 'Change Munitions' buttons on a popup window initiated from the resupply button. If anyone has any other preferences for said button post your suggestions here.

[DarkRob]

EVERYTHING CANISTER button

Don't give me any ideas Reb

[mcaryf]

Hi Reb

That is great - I will look forward to it as it will save me a lot of clicks!

I had a try putting all of D'Erlons call onto all out attack at the beginning of the standard entire army Waterloo scenario. The result was that two brigades out of 8 threw out two sets of skirmishers each from one battalion with strengths of 50 and 56 men in each case. The brigades were the ones nearest to enemy forces at LHS and Frischermont.

It was not obvious to me why that particular size of skirmisher unit was selected and I doubt that I will pursue this option further as the the attack command caused the brigades to start moving in different directions. I guess I will just have to slow the game speed when I want to set up a large skirmish screen to advance in front of an attack.

Regards

Mike

[Didz]

Looking at Rob's doubts about the historical validity of having skirmisher units operating some way off from the parent unit. I suggest you consider the garrison of La Haye Sainte. These were actually skirmish companies spun off from the 2nd KGL Light Battalion and were operating far in front of their parent unit with the intention of breaking up any French attack. Probably for purely game mechanics reasons these 3 units are treated as if they are tiny battalions rather than skirmishers. similarly the 95th rifles unit in the sandpit was in reality a couple of Companies from the 1st Btn. Again I assume for game implementation reasons the rest of the battalion which historically was over the ridge behind Rogers' Battery has been omitted from the battle.

I think this outlines perfectly why I have so little faith in historians, and in particular British historians and their accounts of the battle. I realised over forty years ago that the majority of British accounts of the battle could not be trusted and were essentially based on early propaganda and plaquerised from one book to the next without actually being researched or verified.

That's really why in my determination to understand what really happened at Waterloo i stopped accepting anything in a published account at face value and began going back to sources and researching or at least verifying what the historians claim happened.

As far as the defence of La Haie Sainte is concerned there are several accounts that detail the composition of the garrison and the support it received over the course of the day, and they differ in detail as some of the witnesses were only present part of the time, and others were only aware of part of the activity around the building.

However, the most reliable account is probably that of Major Georg Baring himself, the commander of the 2nd Light Battalion KGL and of the garrison of La Haie Sainte. He was fortunate to have survived the entire battle up to the point when the farm fell and so gives a lucid account of the sequence of events that occurred in its defence including the troops that fell under his command. The only slight gap in his account was around mid-day when the surprise attack of Crabbe's Cuirassiers caught him and part of his garrison in the open wheat field west of the farm and he was forced to abandon his command and ride up into the main Allied position to avoid capture. But it is unlikely that the composition of the garrison changed at all in his absence.

So, he tells us that the entire of his battalion (2nd Light Battalion KGL) were assigned to the garrison of La Haie Sainte with him in command both of the battalion and the farms defence. At this time the KGL battalion strength had been reduced to six companies due to a shortage of recruits.

He goes on to state that one company of the battalion consisting of about 100 men were posted in the orchard to the south of the farm, and these were the men that interfered with the deployment of the French artillery on the rise 50 paces further south and prevented the farm coming under direct artillery fire. they remained in this position until the skirmishers of the 13e Legere suddenly appeared on the ridge crest and forced them to retire into the farmyard. His second in command was killed at this early stage.

The 13e Legere then invested the farm, surrounding it and occupying both the wheatfield to the west and the kitchen garden to the north, effectively cutting off the garrison from supply and support. At this point he mentions that a temporary reprieve was granted by two companies from the 1st Light Battalion KGL (about 200 men) who were dispatched by the brigade to clear the kitchen garden and reopen communications.

However, the reprieve was temporary and eventually at around 12:30 Alten ordered the entire Luneberg battalion forward to clear both the Kitchen garden and the wheat field of French infantry. This attack was entirely successful and the French were forced to abandon their positions and withdraw on their supports. During the course of which retreat the garrison led by himself sallied out through the gate into the wheatfield in order to hasten their retreat and intercept as many as possible.

It was during this pursuit of the French infantry that Baring states he was suddenly set upon by a French cuirassier and forced to flee across the sunken road and back to the safety of the Allied positions on the ridge. Most of the Luneberg Battalion and a significant portion of the garrison that had sallied out of the farm were caught in the open in a state of disarray and either cut down, scattered or driven back up the ridge. Very few of them managed to escape and the Cuirassiers chased them right up to the sunken lane and then began to circumvent the farm overrunning the two guns of Ross' battery (not Roger's at originally stated) posted to overlook the road and its temporary barricade.

[This then triggered the counter-attack by the Household Brigade, which drove off Crabbes Cuirassiers and then escalated to include the rest of the French cavalry and the entire Union Brigade including the Scots Grey's.]

Baring doesn't say how long it took him to get back to his command, but at that point his depleted garrison was reinforced by 2 companies from the 1st Light Battalion (probably the same two that cleared the kitchen garden earlier), and shortly afterwards by 200 x Schutzen detached from the 5th Line Battalion KGL. (Schutzen were effectively volunteer riflemen attached to manay German regiments at the time, and usually young trainee NCO's or officers. A bit like Royal Naval midshipmen, of officer cadets. They operated outside the normal regimental system and were often attached or detached to other units.)

So, in the final stages of the defence the garrison would have been a hybrid mix of the survivors from the 2nd Light plus detachments from the 1st Light and 5th Line Battalion. The garrison was once more cut off as soon as the cavalry battle had subsided and once again Alten tried to re-open communications with it, by sending forward the 5th Line Battalion, with predicable and well documented results. The inability of the Allied cavalry to prevent the farm being isolated coupled with the repeated failure of troops from the main position to keep the communications with it open eventually led to the garrison running out of ammunition despite repeated heroic messengers running the gauntlet to urge Ompteda to send more cartridges.

So, I'm not sure this proves anything about detaching skirmishers except that detachments were made to defend vital points and supply lines etc. A more convoluted example can be found in the fluctuating composition of the garrison of Hougoumont which was constantly been supplemented and reduced as circumstances varied during the day.

However, as a general rule skirmishers were not detached from their parent battalions and generally conformed to the movements of their parent unit. The way it works in SOW is a-historic and already easy to exploit as DarkRob has demonstrated

For D'Erlons' attack some historians have estimated that 20% or more of his strength came forward as skirmishers in front of the advancing columns. Thus from a historic perspective there is nothing wrong in skirmishers operating several hundred yards away from their parent nor in there being large numbers of skirmishers deployed.

I don't really understand how one would make that assumption, but it seems plausible that the forward most skirmisher might find himself 100 paces ahead of his parent unit, as long as his supports and his reserves managed to maintain contact with it. There are diagrams in books like 'Imperial Bayonets' that explain how skirmish lines operated and most deployed in three lines each slightly denser than the first, culminating in the company reserve that would act as a rally point if the line was driven in. So, if each line was say 50 paces apart the foremost line could be up to 200 paces in advance of the main battalion.

The topic of the effective range of canister is a popular one on many internet forums but there cannot be any real doubt that the game's standard limit of 200 yards is well below what it really was. The fact that the French and others developed two types of canister (heavy and light) with heavy typically being used at ranges about 200 yards longer than light clearly demonstrates that a total limit of 200 yards is inappropriate. I do not expect or ask the designers to change it because it does have an impact on other design decisions e.g. the strange choice to have to shoot people out of buildings rather than the historic forcing of doors and windows. I personally would like the facility for a battery commander to select munitions because I have a mod that extends the standard range of canister, but, even disregarding whether increased range is desirable, I think it is a command that historically should be available at battery level in the standard game.

Most wargame rules use this arbitrary limit simply to prevent the player abusing history, which is what they always do given a chance.

If one was to allow canister to be fired at its full range potential one would need to balance this by having the quantity available limited to 2-3 minutes of fire per battle. That way the player can fire it off willy-nilly if they wish but then suffer the consequences if they need it later to defend the battery. Which would be a more historical representation of the real situation faced.

Sometimes it isn't about what happened historically. Sometimes it's just about what works best for the game. There is no doubt that in the games current state skirmishers are overpowered. I've proved it time and time again. And the overpowered aspect is largely based on the sheer numbers of skirmishers you can kick out, and then being able to send them anywhere.

I agree! Historically no unit deployed more than 30% of its strength as skirmishers and depending on the tactical drills of the nation involved only about 1/3rd of the men assigned to skirmishing were actually engaged in skirmishing at any point in time. So, a 600 man battalion might at a pinch deploy a 60 strong skirmish line, with a support line of 60 and a local reserve of another 60. But the game doesn't actually model that arrangement at all.

I had a try putting all of D'Erlons call onto all out attack at the beginning of the standard entire army Waterloo scenario. The result was that two brigades out of 8 threw out two sets of skirmishers each from one battalion with strengths of 50 and 56 men in each case. The brigades were the ones nearest to enemy forces at LHS and Frischermont.

Funnily enough that sounds about right. 50 men per skirmish unit would be about half a company/peleton per battalion which sounds reasonably accurate given the tactical drills for their use.

[DarkRob]

Great post Didz! I'm frequently amazed at how much some of you guys know about the fine details of Waterloo. Ironically, your historical accounts of how skirmishers were used are exactly the type of limitations I feel need to be placed on skirmishers in Scourge of War.
I have no problem with the way skirmishers work on an individual basis. They get the better of it when shooting it out with enemy line infantry at the right distances. That's fine, as I said there needs to be a reason to use them in the first place so they need to be able to do something better than a regular line unit can. It only becomes a problem and only becomes abusable when you start stacking up ridiculous numbers of skirmisher units and using them in all sorts of crazy ways.

2 simple solutions I think would go a long way in curbing their power are just as you describe above. Limit the percentage of a units strength that can be split off as skirmishers, and limit the distance they can move away from their parent unit. Those two things would make a world of difference at limiting their abuse, while still making them effective for the purpose they were used for historically. I would love to see something like this implemented in the next Scourge of War game.

[mcaryf]

Hi Didz
Thank you for your interesting account of the defense of LHS. Clearly from your account Baring's units were effective acting as skirmishers. The unit he sent into the garden clearly performed one of Rob's favoured tactics deterring artillery from getting to close. The troops that came to reinforce him were also effectively skirmish detachments operating several hundred yards in front of their parent brigades and battalions. I think the significant point though was that these skirmishers were effectively attached to an officer. It would probably be quite a good rule for a war game to establish some penalty such as high rate of morale loss if skirmishers are too far from an officer from their own brigade or chain of command.

Turning to canister, the French used two types heavy and light - SOW does not implement that but if it had there would be a natural conservation of the light canister as it could not be used at longer ranges so that would provide your desired reserve for last ditch defense.

The British of course had Shrapnel as well as light canister so they too had a natural way of conserving for an emergency. I find that my own implementation of Shrapnel, which is effective at 750 yards, causes the French player to have to be much more cautious about where his troops are deployed which seems to have some support from accounts in the Peninsular War. I have not yet derived a sensible way in SOW to use it for indirect fire on the Hougoumont orchard as the British actually did but perhaps that is just as well for game balance.

Regards

Mike

[DarkRob]

It would probably be quite a good rule for a war game to establish some penalty such as high rate of morale loss if skirmishers are too far from an officer from their own brigade or chain of command.

While I would like this idea for a board wargame, in a real time strategy game I don't think it's a good idea to put the burden on the player to keep all his skirmishers in a command range, especially in a game where sometimes the unit's are under control of an AI that might not care so much about keeping said units within range of their officer.
Making it so skirmisher units simply can't move more than a specified distance away from their parent unit takes that burden off the player and simply makes it "how the game is".

I also don't think that imposing a few common sense restrictions on skirmishers would necessarily invalidate all the tactics I've come up with for skirmishers. It might make them less abusable, but that's kind of the point. Right now skirmishers have no real restrictions or limitations at all. Everything about them is pretty much limitless.