In defense of McClellan at Antietam: A contrarian view

[exp101]

The interaction between the two men throughout the morning certainly reflected a growing exasperation by each toward the other. McClellan thought Burnside was dawdling while Burnside was convinced his chief didn't appreciate the situation: that his IX Corps had already made a couple of intense attacks and was in the process of going at it again. Burnside wasn't optimally efficient, but McClellan would have saved time and otherwise benefitted from being closer to the action as opposed to 2 miles away and without a line of sight at Pry House.

One of the tragic ironies is that, unknown to both, there was a second and virtually uncontested fordable point just 400 yards north of the bridge discovered by accident around 1:00 pm after the 28th Ohio became lost looking for the bridge during one of the earlier, failed assaults. Ultimately, the final, successful assault on the bridge, the crossing at Snavely and the fording of the creek north by the 28th all happened about the same time.

Below are pertinent excerpts from McClellan's two Antietam reports:

Report of 10/15/1862:
"....The effect of Burnside's movement on the enemy's right was to prevent the further massing of their troops on the left, and we held what we had gained.

Burnside's corps, consisting of Willcox's, Sturgis', and Rodman's divisions, and Cox's Kanawha division, was intrusted with the difficult task of carrying the bridge across the Antietam, near Rohrback's farm, and assaulting the enemy's right, the order having been communicated to him at 10 o'clock a.m...."

and from his (much) later 8/4/1863 report:
"....Early on the morning of the 17th, I ordered General Burnside to form his troops and hold them in readiness to assault the bridge in his front, and to await further orders. At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieutenant Wilson, Topographical Engineers, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, and the advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear. After some time had elapsed, not hearing from him, I dispatched an aide to ascertain what had been done. The aide returned with the information that but little progress had been made. I then sent him back with an order to General Burnside to assault the bridge at once, and carry it at all hazards: The aide returned to me a second time with the report that the bridge was still in the possession of the enemy; whereupon I directed Colonel Sacket, Inspector-General, to deliver to General Burnside my positive order to push forward his troops without a moment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point of the bayonet, and I ordered Colonel Sacket to remain with General Burnside and see that the order was executed promptly...."

http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=19

The discrepancies are considered important by many historians, not only as to the stated original purpose of Burnside's attack (diversion/pinning vs advance upon Sharpsburg from its rear), but the timing McClellan provides for his attack orders to Burnside (10:00 am vs. 8:00 am). As mentioned earlier, McClellan was strongly considering a run for the White House by the time of his 1863 report.

-WJ Palmer

[Young Napoleon]

Ha! Vindicated at last!!!

G

[Willard]

-McClellan's initial post-battle report supported Burnside's claim that the southern operation was a demonstration rather than a full-scale attack -- designed to keep Lee from shifting units north -- and is the version supported by testimony from Burnside's staff.

This is totally contrary to what I have read. I remember reading about McClellan becoming insistently more demanding with his orders for Burnside to move forward. Yes, they were good friends, so McClellan's demeanor with his first orders were mild as Burnside reported back excuses for his delays. But then after several more hours and repeated urgings, McClellan was eventually reduced to threatening demands, which eventually got Burnside moving...but way too late to make the initial plan effective to enable a resounding victory.

But Palmer, you're probably more well read about this than I am, I'm just reporting the limited stuff I've studied, and assumed to be fact. I'm not a history buff, I just basically study for scenario design.

Reb -

I am curious to your reaction to the article and its potential impact on scenario design. Do you believe these numbers to be true? My guess is Thorp has down a lot of research and to come forward with a claim that Lee's forces were under-counted at Antietam really provides for a completely renewed analysis of how the battle was fought and in evaluating the performance of Lee and McClellan.

-Willard

[Marching Thru Georgia]

Interesting thread. To pile a little more controversy onto the fire, I would submit that Burnside was the only Union commander that day to accomplish his task fully. Had McClellan supported him with V corps, the war in the east may have ended that day. Apparently, Lincoln thought so too, as Burnside was given command of the AOP shortly afterwards.

[RebBugler]

Reb -

I am curious to your reaction to the article and its potential impact on scenario design. Do you believe these numbers to be true? My guess is Thorp has down a lot of research and to come forward with a claim that Lee's forces were under-counted at Antietam really provides for a completely renewed analysis of how the battle was fought and in evaluating the performance of Lee and McClellan.

-Willard

Of course any change of troop strengths alters the basic goal of a historically labeled scenario: Can you achieve better results than said General in fighting said battle? In regard to Thorp's numbers I would tend to agree because of the eventual results...Lee survived to fight another day.

Although us Rebs hate to admit it, our forefathers weren't supermen. Agreed, they were more adept to hardships and surviving by hunting and other vigorous life demands than the New England Yanks, but the life skills of the upper northwest Yanks from where the Iron Brigade originated were equally challenging, if not more...making for inherently tough troops.

But I'm thinking you want a Generaling answer here...How did McClellan fare against Lee? Given Thorp's numbers, I'd say Lee screwed up dividing his army and biting off more than he could chew. McClellan on the other hand, still had the advantage in numbers, on basically northern soil with secure supply lines, and especially, superior artillery, but didn't deploy these strengths efficiently. Still, if Burnside hadn't screwed up the main attack that last day, a McClellan smashing of Lee's army that final day would have cloaked his otherwise less than efficient strategies.

This is why I stuck my toe in this thread, I blame Burnside, so, as a 'proud to be' Reb, I honor Burnside. But bloodshed wise, it's horrific that the war continued on, especially Sherman's rape of the South's heartland, when it probably could have been ended here, with Lee's army trapped, on the banks of the Potomac.

SO, If Burnside hadn't hesitated, a full half day, to carry out crucial orders...Gives us the grandest of all WHAT IF scenarios...THE END OF THE WAR IN VIRGINIA AND THE EAST, DECEMBER, 1862, as the captured Robert E. Lee surrenders the remainder of his ANV forces, and by July 4th, 1863, Vicksburg falls, ending the last Rebel resistance IN THE WEST...BY DECEMBER, 1863, THE ACW IS OVER.

Kinda went overboard with this...but you asked, and I've never been one to trivialize. :ohmy:

[NY Cavalry]

I'm not going to say too much before I read and reread about the battles events, but I will say that if Burnside had attacked earlier in the day that he would have been opposed by more than 600 Georgians. His attack if launched early would have been repulsed with heavy loss. Burnside launched his attack later in the day after Longstreet had sent much his corp to the northern end of the battlefield.

[RebBugler]

I'm not going to say too much before I read and reread about the battles events, but I will say that if Burnside had attacked earlier in the day that he would have been opposed by more than 600 Georgians. His attack if launched early would have been repulsed with heavy loss. Burnside launched his attack later in the day after Longstreet had sent much his corp to the northern end of the battlefield.

Well, I kinda agree. But to be sure, more scenarios are needed...heh heh heh

[13thnct]

Excellent article! I've heard the argument made about the disparity in numbers, but never so concisely with excellent graphics. Every PC game from TalonSoft to Sid Meiers to this one have always left me wondering how the Confederates could have done it!

I'm not going to say too much before I read and reread about the battles events, but I will say that if Burnside had attacked earlier in the day that he would have been opposed by more than 600 Georgians. His attack if launched early would have been repulsed with heavy loss. Burnside launched his attack later in the day after Longstreet had sent much his corp to the northern end of the battlefield.

Well, I kinda agree. But to be sure, more scenarios are needed...heh heh heh

It's interesting how people often rank little Mac's performance based on how quickly he responded to S.O. 191 or how he fought at Antietam. However, what I think is more telling is what McClellan did after seizing South Mountain. With the Gaps cleared at dusk on the 14th the AOP should have been hot on the heals of Lee's army on the following day, yet instead McClellan left Lee to concentrate and left Harper's Ferry to its fate. It'd require a lot of speculation, but I think McClellan acting on the 15th could make for a good what if scenario, one definitely favoring the Union.
The what if scenario I'd stil

[RebBugler]

13thnct

It's interesting how people often rank little Mac's performance based on how quickly he responded to S.O. 191 or how he fought at Antietam. However, what I think is more telling is what McClellan did after seizing South Mountain. With the Gaps cleared at dusk on the 14th the AOP should have been hot on the heals of Lee's army on the following day, yet instead McClellan left Lee to concentrate and left Harper's Ferry to its fate. It'd require a lot of speculation, but I think McClellan acting on the 15th could make for a good what if scenario, one definitely favoring the Union.

Nope, I disagree. Then Lee would have had no choice but to escape across the Potomac. As it turned out, in making a stand, Lee's ego set the stage for his army to be annihilated, his back to the potomac, with limited ground for an escape if things went south.

Moving back to NY's post...The best attack window for Burnside was probably around 10 AM as the extra Reb troops had already left to reinforce the north. This would have given him time to carry the bridge, destroy the meager forces defending just south of Sharpsburg, and cut off Lee's escape route. Also Sykes would have had to make a concentrated effort in the middle to reinforce this blocking effort. Was McClellan capable of managing this series of events? ...Who knows?

[Baldwin]

I would trust a historian like McPherson or Sears (who said it was 50,000-55,000 for the Confederacy) any day over The Washington Post. In the charts they reference northern newspapers half the time who were just guessing at the numbers, even the official records use words like "perhaps" or 'I think" and are estimating as well. You just have to face it Willard that Lee was a better general by far than McClellan - Lincoln wouldn't have replaced McClellan otherwise. It's a well known fact the Confederates were almost always outnumbered and had better generals. Plus the fact still remains, he intercepted Lee's plans and could still not defeat Lee.