Campaign Options for Wavre
Posted: Fri Apr 14, 2017 8:53 pm
The launch of the new Wavre scenarios has enabled me to start thinking about the next stage of my campaign game that is based on using historic starting forces but eradicating the more serious errors the French commanders made. Thus I have now created scenarios for Ligny and QB where Napoleon gets to use the Cavalry and 4th Division from D’Erlon’s Corps at Ligny and Ney can use the 1st Division and Corps artillery at QB and the player can decide whether to use either or both the other two D’Erlon Divisions at Ligny or QB.
I am now thinking about the impact of eradicating the mistake that Napoleon made in not despatching Grouchy to follow the Prussians until 11am on 17th June and the mistake that Grouchy and his commanders made in not continuing their advance as early as they could have done on the 18th June. The impact of these mistakes was probably to delay Grouchy’s progress by at least 5 hours. This would mean that his forces would be ready to attack across the Dyle at Limale, Bierges or Wavre before noon.
I have not previously seen any serious analysis of Grouchy’s real options with most commentators satisfying themselves with the statement that by acting more quickly he could have disrupted the Prussian move towards Waterloo.
In fact even if he had been at the Dyle by noon he would not have been able to stop Bulow’s IVth Corps the rear of which was past the Limale area by then. The two other Corps that historically moved to Waterloo were Pirch’s IInd Corps and Ziethen’s Ist Corps. Apart from a detachment under Stengel guarding the crossing at Limale, Ziethen’s Corps was in the area of Bierges and did not actually start to move towards Waterloo until about 2pm as it was delayed by IInd Corps passing to the North of it on the way to join IVth Corps. Soon after noon the van of IInd Corps would have been passing to the North of Limale.
The main body of Thielmann’s III Corps was at La Bavette North of Wavre but with some detachments guarding Dyle crossings. He was expecting to follow Pirch to Waterloo if the French did not threaten the Wavre area.
What then would Grouchy’s options be?
1) He could attack and try to cross at Limale about noon. That would probably result in Pirch’s Corps heading down to join Stengel’s force guarding the crossing otherwise their column could be taken in flank once Grouchy thrust Stengel aside. Historically the vanguard of Pirch’s Corps reached Plancenoit at about 7pm and delivered a decisive attack there contributing significantly to the French defeat. An attack at Limale being contained by Pirch would not prevent Ziethen from moving to Waterloo where his van arrived at about 7.30pm and importantly reinforced Wellington’s left flank allowing the English cavalry there to move to reinforce Wellington’s centre. In the event of an early Limale attack, Thielmann’s Corps could probably try to reinforce Pirch by moving along both banks of the Dyle from Wavre. This might well result in a heavy defeat for Grouchy if part of his force became trapped on the wrong side. This risk would also depend on how much strength Grouchy had but he would have prevented two Prussian Corps from joining Wellington.
2) Grouchy could attack Bierges any time up to 2pm. This would engage Ziethen and almost certainly prevent his Corps from moving to Waterloo, however of the three Prussian Corps that went to Waterloo Ziethen’s was the weakest having suffered heavy losses both before and at Ligny . Bierges is closer to Thielmann’s main body at La Bavette and his Corps could potentially reinforce Ziethen more quickly than it could Pirch’s Corps if Grouchy attacked at Limale.
3) Grouchy could delay and attack Limale after most of Pirch’s Corps had passed through to the North of the village. A threat to Pirch’s rear might result in Ziethen moving to assist whilst Pirch’s van continued to move toward Plancenoit. The outcome would be that Ziethen would not move to Waterloo but as Grouchy would be fighting the weakest Prussian Corps (I), he might be able to withdraw from the battle before Thielmann’s reinforcement’s arrived and preserve his threat from the far side of the Dyle.
4) Finally if Grouchy had been assigned more of a token force, which is what the Prussians thought he had, he could just demonstrate opposite Wavre to ensure that Thielmann did not also move to Waterloo which might be significant if Waterloo went on into a second day.
I would be interested to have any comments as to whether there are more options before I start to develop the scenario. I will probably make it start at 11am with Grouchy about an hour from Limale. I will give Grouchy the units in his OOB that he actually had into which I will slot whatever strengths they have after my Ligny scenario. I will build in facilities so that the player can discard those units that he chooses to be at Waterloo which would probably be Gerard’s Corps.
These are the sort of considerations a player will have to evaluate in deciding how much strength to allocate to Grouchy after the conclusion of Ligny at the same time the player will also need to judge how much more strength the French might need at Waterloo. I had not previously thought much about events from Grouchy’s perspective. He did have more than 30,000 men, albeit recently heavily engaged, but he was following a Prussian Army with in excess of 50,000, albeit recently defeated, which was meeting up with another entirely fresh Corps with more than another 30,000 men. Perhaps his forces’ late start on the 18th June indicated that they were not entirely certain they really wanted to meet up with the 85,000 enemies ahead of them!
Regards
Mike
I am now thinking about the impact of eradicating the mistake that Napoleon made in not despatching Grouchy to follow the Prussians until 11am on 17th June and the mistake that Grouchy and his commanders made in not continuing their advance as early as they could have done on the 18th June. The impact of these mistakes was probably to delay Grouchy’s progress by at least 5 hours. This would mean that his forces would be ready to attack across the Dyle at Limale, Bierges or Wavre before noon.
I have not previously seen any serious analysis of Grouchy’s real options with most commentators satisfying themselves with the statement that by acting more quickly he could have disrupted the Prussian move towards Waterloo.
In fact even if he had been at the Dyle by noon he would not have been able to stop Bulow’s IVth Corps the rear of which was past the Limale area by then. The two other Corps that historically moved to Waterloo were Pirch’s IInd Corps and Ziethen’s Ist Corps. Apart from a detachment under Stengel guarding the crossing at Limale, Ziethen’s Corps was in the area of Bierges and did not actually start to move towards Waterloo until about 2pm as it was delayed by IInd Corps passing to the North of it on the way to join IVth Corps. Soon after noon the van of IInd Corps would have been passing to the North of Limale.
The main body of Thielmann’s III Corps was at La Bavette North of Wavre but with some detachments guarding Dyle crossings. He was expecting to follow Pirch to Waterloo if the French did not threaten the Wavre area.
What then would Grouchy’s options be?
1) He could attack and try to cross at Limale about noon. That would probably result in Pirch’s Corps heading down to join Stengel’s force guarding the crossing otherwise their column could be taken in flank once Grouchy thrust Stengel aside. Historically the vanguard of Pirch’s Corps reached Plancenoit at about 7pm and delivered a decisive attack there contributing significantly to the French defeat. An attack at Limale being contained by Pirch would not prevent Ziethen from moving to Waterloo where his van arrived at about 7.30pm and importantly reinforced Wellington’s left flank allowing the English cavalry there to move to reinforce Wellington’s centre. In the event of an early Limale attack, Thielmann’s Corps could probably try to reinforce Pirch by moving along both banks of the Dyle from Wavre. This might well result in a heavy defeat for Grouchy if part of his force became trapped on the wrong side. This risk would also depend on how much strength Grouchy had but he would have prevented two Prussian Corps from joining Wellington.
2) Grouchy could attack Bierges any time up to 2pm. This would engage Ziethen and almost certainly prevent his Corps from moving to Waterloo, however of the three Prussian Corps that went to Waterloo Ziethen’s was the weakest having suffered heavy losses both before and at Ligny . Bierges is closer to Thielmann’s main body at La Bavette and his Corps could potentially reinforce Ziethen more quickly than it could Pirch’s Corps if Grouchy attacked at Limale.
3) Grouchy could delay and attack Limale after most of Pirch’s Corps had passed through to the North of the village. A threat to Pirch’s rear might result in Ziethen moving to assist whilst Pirch’s van continued to move toward Plancenoit. The outcome would be that Ziethen would not move to Waterloo but as Grouchy would be fighting the weakest Prussian Corps (I), he might be able to withdraw from the battle before Thielmann’s reinforcement’s arrived and preserve his threat from the far side of the Dyle.
4) Finally if Grouchy had been assigned more of a token force, which is what the Prussians thought he had, he could just demonstrate opposite Wavre to ensure that Thielmann did not also move to Waterloo which might be significant if Waterloo went on into a second day.
I would be interested to have any comments as to whether there are more options before I start to develop the scenario. I will probably make it start at 11am with Grouchy about an hour from Limale. I will give Grouchy the units in his OOB that he actually had into which I will slot whatever strengths they have after my Ligny scenario. I will build in facilities so that the player can discard those units that he chooses to be at Waterloo which would probably be Gerard’s Corps.
These are the sort of considerations a player will have to evaluate in deciding how much strength to allocate to Grouchy after the conclusion of Ligny at the same time the player will also need to judge how much more strength the French might need at Waterloo. I had not previously thought much about events from Grouchy’s perspective. He did have more than 30,000 men, albeit recently heavily engaged, but he was following a Prussian Army with in excess of 50,000, albeit recently defeated, which was meeting up with another entirely fresh Corps with more than another 30,000 men. Perhaps his forces’ late start on the 18th June indicated that they were not entirely certain they really wanted to meet up with the 85,000 enemies ahead of them!
Regards
Mike