How to use ATTACK Columns ?

[AP514]

ok for some reason I can not get Attack columns to work...correctly ?
I have a firing line upfront......in the 2nd/3rd line i give the units orders/manually set Attack column
I set a unit to Attack Column..(Column by Div) move to the next unit to set it to attack column..i look back and the first unit is in line again ? ? ? what gives ???


As it is now every time units come close to enemy they go into Line....makes the game feel way to ACW style....

[Gunfreak]

ok for some reason I can not get Attack columns to work...correctly ?
I have a firing line upfront......in the 2nd/3rd line i give the units orders/manually set Attack column
I set a unit to Attack Column..(Column by Div) move to the next unit to set it to attack column..i look back and the first unit is in line again ? ? ? what gives ???


As it is now every time units come close to enemy they go into Line....makes the game feel way to ACW style....

Column of division was not an attack column. It was a manouver formation. The attack be it with musketballs or cold steel would always be in line.

The whole french columns vs british lines comes from Oman and his books on the peninsular war. While it did happen once or twice that columns impacted lines ( in a six year long war)

It was by mistake, french officers stumbling into british lines, as they didn't exactly know were the British were.

[Marching Thru Georgia]

After the 1807 war with Russia, the use of the attack column became more and more frequent to bring home the advance. After that war and the steady drain of trained troops to the Peninsula, there were not enough well trained troops to be able to deploy into line while under fire. In fact in 1809 Napoleon insisted on this. More to the point before the 1815 campaign, Nappy stated that his troops needed to know only two formations, the square and attack column.

[Gunfreak]

After the 1807 war with Russia, the use of the attack column became more and more frequent to bring home the advance. After that war and the steady drain of trained troops to the Peninsula, there were not enough well trained troops to be able to deploy into line while under fire. In fact in 1809 Napoleon insisted on this. More to the point before the 1815 campaign, Nappy stated that his troops needed to know only two formations, the square and attack column.

Sources please, except when by mistake, i have never seen evidence of column by division used as anything but manovre formation.


And the internet talk about french in 1813 and landwehr in 1813 not fighting in line because it was too hard, i still just talk.
Remember column by division is just companies in line, for the avrage soldier its the same if he is in line in a company or a line in a battalion, he is still just in his little world which is either a company or even smaller a platoon.

Now in theory bad officers/ncos (those that make the hinge between companies) might have an effect, but for rank and file, they move in line and fight in line weather it's a 2 company wide formation or 6 company wide.

If you slam into a line in column of division the line simply wraps around the column formation. Or even before that if you get to close to a line in column you might be fired on from the flank.

And napoleons quip remark in 1815 is just napoleon beenig napoleon, like kruzev saying bullets are for dummies bayonets are for the smart. No bearing on actual tactics. Especially concidering the first french attack at waterloo was made by a division + all in line formation.

[mitra76]

If you command directly the brigade the mode is to use the attack march (but you can use it also for AI units)

The AI on the other side must have first the good attack angle respect the target for avoid to run in the void and the a good superiority in terms of numbers and various bonus primarly. It has to be sure to have a good chance to win the melee before decide to reach the contact.

I know like this the AI is more conservative respect the use of attack columns but preserve but melee can be really destructive so the AI needs to be careful otherwise it risks to waste player troops.

In anycase these checks can be changed modding if a modder want a more column-like AI.

[Saddletank]

And the internet talk about french in 1813 and landwehr in 1813 not fighting in line because it was too hard, i still just talk.

Sources? I don't consider Christopher Duffy, David Chandler and other academics to be "internet talk". You've read Chandler's "Campaigns of Napoleon"? He goes into considerable detail about the lack of tactical adroitness of the Marie Louises.

Remember column by division is just companies in line, for the avrage soldier its the same if he is in line in a company or a line in a battalion, he is still just in his little world which is either a company or even smaller a platoon.

Now in theory bad officers/ncos (those that make the hinge between companies) might have an effect, but for rank and file, they move in line and fight in line weather it's a 2 company wide formation or 6 company wide.

A column of divisions has a 2-company frontage. A line has a 9-company frontage prior to 1809 and a 6-company frontage after that. Both formations would use the same pace (cadence) to manoeuvre but because a column of divisions is less than 1/4 (or after 1809, 1/3rd) the frontage of the same battalion in line it can wheel more rapidly, and cover broken ground more rapidly as it will have to halt to dress disordered ranks less often.

The shorter frontage formation therefore requires less control by its officers, fewer basic commands to work it and with fewer halts to dress ranks, the morale-boosting momentum of forward movement is more easily maintained which has a positive psychological effect on raw troops. In addition with only 1/4 or 1/3rd of the battalion having a clear view of threats to the front fewer men are disposed to worry or falter. Of course the more troops within the column who lack a clear view of their surroundings also has a negative effect when problems begin but the basic concept of the column was to move more quickly, in a direction of approach that could be varied so as to disconcert a stationary (linear) enemy, make more use of protective folds in the ground and a number of other positive tactical aspects.

A column (any column) is much more manoeuvrable than a line on anything but a parade ground because it has this smaller frontage.

This is why columns were used over lines as a means to manoeuvre. A line is unwieldy by comparison.

To suggest that the psychological forces acting upon a soldier in the front rank or two of a line is the same as those on one in a company line near the rear of a column is simply incorrect and merely exposes a lack of understanding of the nuts and bolts reality of close order black powder warfare.

If you slam into a line in column of division the line simply wraps around the column formation.

In Napoleonic warfare, nobody "slammed into" anything. Your description reveals a misunderstanding of Napoleonic combat. If an assaulting column did press on to threaten contact with a line, the line would break and retire before the bayonet stabbing started. If a line was steady enough to stand as a column approached it would deliver a volley and the column would more than likely halt in disorder and try to form a firing line.

[Gunfreak]

And the internet talk about french in 1813 and landwehr in 1813 not fighting in line because it was too hard, i still just talk.

Sources? I don't consider Christopher Duffy, David Chandler and other academics to be "internet talk". You've read Chandler's "Campaigns of Napoleon"? He goes into considerable detail about the lack of tactical adroitness of the Marie Louises.

Chandler is good but dated, havnt read Duffy on Napoleon only his one of his on the 7 years war

Remember column by division is just companies in line, for the avrage soldier its the same if he is in line in a company or a line in a battalion, he is still just in his little world which is either a company or even smaller a platoon.

Now in theory bad officers/ncos (those that make the hinge between companies) might have an effect, but for rank and file, they move in line and fight in line weather it's a 2 company wide formation or 6 company wide.

A column of divisions has a 2-company frontage. A line has a 9-company frontage prior to 1809 and a 6-company frontage after that. Both formations would use the same pace (cadence) to manoeuvre but because a column of divisions is less than 1/4 (or after 1809, 1/3rd) the frontage of the same battalion in line it can wheel more rapidly, and cover broken ground more rapidly as it will have to halt to dress disordered ranks less often.

The shorter frontage formation therefore requires less control by its officers, fewer basic commands to work it and with fewer halts to dress ranks, the morale-boosting momentum of forward movement is more easily maintained which has a positive psychological effect on raw troops. In addition with only 1/4 or 1/3rd of the battalion having a clear view of threats to the front fewer men are disposed to worry or falter. Of course the more troops within the column who lack a clear view of their surroundings also has a negative effect when problems begin but the basic concept of the column was to move more quickly, in a direction of approach that could be varied so as to disconcert a stationary (linear) enemy, make more use of protective folds in the ground and a number of other positive tactical aspects.

A column (any column) is much more manoeuvrable than a line on anything but a parade ground because it has this smaller frontage.

This is why columns were used over lines as a means to manoeuvre. A line is unwieldy by comparison.

To suggest that the psychological forces acting upon a soldier in the front rank or two of a line is the same as those on one in a company line near the rear of a column is simply incorrect and merely exposes a lack of understanding of the nuts and bolts reality of close order black powder warfare.

If you slam into a line in column of division the line simply wraps around the column formation.

In Napoleonic warfare, nobody "slammed into" anything. Your description reveals a misunderstanding of Napoleonic combat. If an assaulting column did press on to threaten contact with a line, the line would break and retire before the bayonet stabbing started. If a line was steady enough to stand as a column approached it would deliver a volley and the column would more than likely halt in disorder and try to form a firing line.

I never said said column didn't have its uses (for manoeuvreing)
tho rarely used alone, it was usually a mix of line, column and skirmishes. Line infront or center with column on the flank.

I know perfectly well how it worked in thoery, but thats not how it worked in real life, in theory they march in column, deploy in line right outside musket range and go for a slow chrage, hoping the defenders have low moral or to few men if they don't, the attack usually bogs down into a firefight, that lasts untill one side runs.mif the defenders hold, the attacker tries again with fresh battalions, and hopefully close arty support, this ebs back and fourth untill one side gives, or run out of reserves (why do you think the battles got so bloody )

If you attack with in musket range in columns, the flanks of the defenders in line can shot at the flabks4mof the columns. This leadsmto the column stallingm hopefully they run, more likely the end up standing stil, getting shot in the front and flanks while only beeing able to fire effectevly with 2 companies.

The closeing formation was always going to be line, if you got with in musket range in column, the chief de battalino/colonel/brigader had made a mistake. And most likely lots of his troops would be shot to pieces.

[Marching Thru Georgia]

The closeing formation was always going to be line, if you got with in musket range in column, the chief de battalino/colonel/brigader had made a mistake. And most likely lots of his troops would be shot to pieces.

This is utterly wrong from 1809 onward. At Borodino the French fought the entire battle in two formations, skirmishers and attack columns. The idea that a conscript army is able to mount complicated evolutions while under fire is Hollywood, nothing more. Even the Guard failed in this effort at Waterloo. By 1809 all the continental armies accepted this fact. Advancing in line became the exception not the rule. As such the armies were for the most part equal in quality. Only the superiority of the French officer corps allowed Boney to keep winning. But after the retreat in 1812 and the destruction of another army at Leipzig, that removed even that advantage.

[Bloody Bill]

Gunfreak I would suggest you read Imperial bayonets. It was put together by Nafziger with works form Gen. Jomini and others from the period. There are specific attack docrine notes and combat reports. All of witch support the column as a smashing formation used more and more as the Napoleonic wars drug on. It was a very difficult thing to form from column to line in front of the enemy but the column gave the false impression of safety and morale boost needed for less trained troops.

Carl von Clausewitz book "Principles of war" a study for his imperial highness also very clearly show the column as a battering tool to close with and defeat the enemy instead of getting into costly firefights with raw troops.

I believe both books are available on Amazon and both have notes or writing from participants in these wars. We can only guess on what happened that is why I like to read from the men that were there.

Like wise the "Complete Record of the War of the Rebellion" is a must for any Civil War fan or historian.

[Jim]

There may be more shades of gray here. In the Peninsular campaign the French advanced with some frequency in attack column against British infantry standing in line often on a reverse slope. As the British line would then advance into firing range before the French could deploy from attack column into line this usually resulted in a bad outcome for the French. See for example the battles of Bussaco and Sorauren. Given d'Erlon's extensive experience in the Peninsular campaign, one suspects that the attack formation of a column of battalions in line was a reaction to the failures in Spain.

In contrast the attack column could be effective against troops less well disciplined and less well commanded. There the psychological threat could cause the defenders to rout before any serious firefight occurred.

-Jim