Recommended strategy for Antietam Scenario Old Jack's Left Wing

[kaplan71]

Hello --

I am playing Antietam Scenario 3 - Old Jack's Left Wing, and I am trying to come up with a strategy that will enable my being able hold off the Union attacks without completely eradicating my command. So far, the only thing that seems to make sense is pull my units back from their forward positions as quickly as possible to get them out of the range of the enemy artillery, and initial assaults. But even this has resulted in my initially suffering much more casualties then the enemy.

Does anyone have insight into what might work here?

Thanks.

[Hancock the Superb]

You need to take the East Woods as quickly as possible...and that means dispatching the Bucktails (sharpshooters with 400 yard rifles) as quickly as possible...melee with Trimble's biggest regiment. Put the Stonewall Division on the fenceline from the West Woods to the Cornfield, and Lawton's Brigade on the cornfield fence. Battle Trimble forward to the North Edge of the East Woods. Once you are in that position (make sure to bring up your artillery), you can send in reinforcements to bolster weak parts of your line as need be.

[kaplan71]

Hello

Thanks for your reply. The thing is, this sceario is fought from the Confederate side.

I am asking what would be the best strategy for defending against th Union attack?

Thanks.

[Hancock the Superb]

I am describing the series of manovers I took to win the scenarios as General Jackson. I think if you follow them closely, you should do a magnificent number on the enemy.

By dispatching the Bucktails I meant you need to route them first thing...as in the first minute of gameplay.

[kaplan71]

Hello --

Does that include dispatching Anderson's and the other brigades in the vicinity along with the artillery formations from the south as well?

[Hancock the Superb]

I am not quite sure what you mean. Anderson's CS Division is not under your control in the south...Anderson's CS Brigade, of DH Hill's Division could be brought up if you want. Anderson's Union brigade is a long ways off and should not be attacked, nor all that artillery to the North. Just take the East Woods, hold the fence along the south edge of the cornfield, and you should be fine.

[achilles]

Pull back to compact your line and extend it to the right using the fences, let Early look out for your left flank in the west woods (the woods will slow the union down so dont worry about it too much, you should break hooker long before your left becomes a concern). Put all your guns on the tree line and in front of your infantry (makes sure theyre TC'd), on the right do the same thing but be ready to set them to withdraw by recoil when the infantry gets close. Let Hooker come to you and let the canister do the work. I spend more time micromanaging my guns than my regiments, they kill so much faster.

This would have been a RL winning strategy for Jackson, especially if he had bothered to entrench and not worry about wrestling the tactically and strategically pointless cornfield away from the union again and again. If you ever visit Antietam, its fun to stand looking at Jackson's orginal line and staring into the cornfield wondering why in the hell you would want to advance into that instead of digging a nice hole and staying put since you know the union is coming to you anyway.
Would have been an early Cold Harbor if Jackson had any interest in digging trenches.

[Little Powell]

You offer an interesting perspective on the early AM fighting at Antietam, achilles. Good post.

Since The Cornfield is such a famous place and the fighting there has become synonymous with the ACW, we don't really think much about Jackson's strategy and why he insisted on taking/holding it. You have to wonder what the intention was of moving his center forward into the cornfield, instead of letting Hooker keep pressing towards the Dunker Church, effectively getting caught in a pincer between the Rebel forces in the East and West woods.

[Marching Thru Georgia]

Little Powell wrote:

Since The Cornfield is such a famous place and the fighting there has become synonymous with the ACW, we don't really think much about Jackson's strategy and why he insisted on taking/holding it. You have to wonder what the intention was of moving his center forward into the cornfield, instead of letting Hooker keep pressing towards the Dunker Church, effectively getting caught in a pincer between the Rebel forces in the East and West woods.

You've just shown why Jackson was so overrated. In reality, he was a poor tactician.

[achilles]

Thanks Powell Though sheer good luck we got John Hoptak as our guide at Sharpsburg a couple years ago (I believe I saw a post that you guys had him for a guide in your research, didnt know it at the time). That guy is awesome- I might of told the story in another thread that we asked him on the way out if he new anything about South Mountain (punchline, we didn't know it then but he wrote THE book on South Mountain).

Anyway, we discussed the cornfield and he didn't have a good answer either. Whoever held it was subject to fire from the whole field, and enfiladed from at least 2 sides, and it wasn't particularly high ground or anything useful. Entrenching wasn't much in vogue at that point in the war, which was unfortunate because the south had a couple of days to do so if they had wished. Best we could figure is that at that point in the war, it was hard to keep relatively undisciplined troops in line standing still and taking fire. On the other hand, you could get them to charge a lot more easily (odd idn't it?). So if you were standing still you were going to start going backwards, so you needed to advance just to hold your ground. Jackson wasn't the standing still type I suppose.

I think the real danger to Lee's position was the East Woods (which we found out stretched further south than they do today). If Mansfield had advanced alongside Hooker and with enough strength, Lee would have had a bad time. The woods were a dagger right into the confederate center and you wouldn't know it until too late.