Scourge of War Boards

I don't think that Meade should take blame for not telling Sickles what to do. He was a Corps Commander for Christ's Sake. He should have had a better handle on the situation. In my humble opinion, I think that Sickles only used the vague order defense to justify his decision. Perhaps he should have used Temporary Insanity

I have been to Gettysburg numerous times and can also confirm that the Peach Order is on higher ground than Cemetery Ridge just north of the Round Tops. In fact, that section of the ridge is quite unimpressive. However, that still doesn't justify Sickles creating a salient in the overall Union line and extending his own line of responsibility to the point that he couldn't adequately cover it all.

In fact, Meade should be praised for keeping his head and quickly pulling any and all reinforcements into his left flank. Essentially, Sickles was soundly defeated on the afternoon of the 2nd, but the Confederates were worn down by successive waves of reinforcements.

The Peach Orchard was barely higher ground, only 20 ft higher (440 vs 464 per Warren map). Over the 1400 yds to Cemetery Ridge, this is trivial. The real error is the Sickles gave up a lot of open ground to his front. The distance from Cemetery Ridge just north of the George Weikert farm to Peach Orchard is about 1400 yards. In contrast the distance from the Peach Orchard to the nearest woods on Seminary Ridge is a bit under 600 yards. The additional 800 yards for the artillery to soften up the attacking CS infantry was no small factor as shown by the events of July 3rd. In addition, the 2nd Corps artillery to the north could also have made their contribution to Southern Discomfort.

-Jim

Jim wrote:

The Peach Orchard was barely higher ground, only 20 ft higher (440 vs 464 per Warren map). Over the 1400 yds to Cemetery Ridge, this is trivial. The real error is the Sickles gave up a lot of open ground to his front. The distance from Cemetery Ridge just north of the George Weikert farm to Peach Orchard is about 1400 yards. In contrast the distance from the Peach Orchard to the nearest woods on Seminary Ridge is a bit under 600 yards. The additional 800 yards for the artillery to soften up the attacking CS infantry was no small factor as shown by the events of July 3rd. In addition, the 2nd Corps artillery to the north could also have made their contribution to Southern Discomfort.

-Jim

Pretty much this. The Confederates had very little ground to cover before hitting his lines, plus he had no flank support, plus he didn't have enough troops to hold his position.

But other than that, it wasn't a bad idea!

PS: Remember that Sickles didn't know exactly where the Confederates were; it was believed, they were to the north on Seminary Ridge and around the city. His skirmishers reported enemy activity, and then he decided to advance. It seems to me that he should've advanced only if they didn't report any contact with the enemy, not if they did. I guess he was just convinced an attack was coming (which it was) and that the ground he was on was indefensible.

But his position did hold up the Confederate attack and make it waste momentum, time, and men, so maybe it benefited the Union in what basically became a defense-in-depth.

IronBMike wrote:

Jim wrote:

The Peach Orchard was barely higher ground, only 20 ft higher (440 vs 464 per Warren map). Over the 1400 yds to Cemetery Ridge, this is trivial. The real error is the Sickles gave up a lot of open ground to his front. The distance from Cemetery Ridge just north of the George Weikert farm to Peach Orchard is about 1400 yards. In contrast the distance from the Peach Orchard to the nearest woods on Seminary Ridge is a bit under 600 yards. The additional 800 yards for the artillery to soften up the attacking CS infantry was no small factor as shown by the events of July 3rd. In addition, the 2nd Corps artillery to the north could also have made their contribution to Southern Discomfort.

-Jim

Pretty much this. The Confederates had very little ground to cover before hitting his lines, plus he had no flank support, plus he didn't have enough troops to hold his position.

But other than that, it wasn't a bad idea!

PS: Remember that Sickles didn't know exactly where the Confederates were; it was believed, they were to the north on Seminary Ridge and around the city. His skirmishers reported enemy activity, and then he decided to advance. It seems to me that he should've advanced only if they didn't report any contact with the enemy, not if they did. I guess he was just convinced an attack was coming (which it was) and that the ground he was on was indefensible.

But his position did hold up the Confederate attack and make it waste momentum, time, and men, so maybe it benefited the Union in what basically became a defense-in-depth.

Yeah, I agree with this. It's way too simplistic to argue, well he was a Corps commander (he really should have never been one) and Meade should have expected more. The reality is Meade should have known to help Sickles out since he wasn't a West Pointer and didn't have the engineer's take on battlefield topography. What Sickles did have was that he was aggressive and a fighter, he just needed help setting his position. He begged for specific direction all morning and afternoon long on July 2, yet Meade didn't bother with more than, just extend the line from the II Corps. Henry Hunt when he went out there even told him the Peach Orchard area would be a good platform for artillery and that the position was sound. And like IronMike said, the Confederates weren't on his left flank just yet and were to his right and front.

What Sickles did was a mistake because he didn't just form a line to the south of II Corps, but we have to remember nobody was sure if they were going to take the offensive or just defend just yet, and other than the Confederates in the town and at Seminary Ridge, the battle lines were still not completely drawn out. It's easy to criticize in hindsight, but less so I think at the very moment of decision and execution.

My secret to using cover is to place all my fat troops in the front line, then the men behind them receive the "in cover" bonus.

You know what is great about this Sickles was right/wrong argument?
Pretty soon we will be able to run some great experiments to see for ourselves!

By any chance are there scenarios in game that take a what if Sickles behaved
starting point?

Remembering that Sickles was not a West Pointer, (he was the only AOP Corps commander who wasn't), he was learning on the fly. Now the last major battle he was in was Chancellorsville. Remember what happened there. Jackson was to his front. Jackson completely vacated his position there for his attack on the Union right which crumbled just about the entire AOP. Sickles was on fairly bad ground and reported that he didn't think Jackson was in front of him anymore and asked permission to advance which was denied. If he was given that opportunity he may have turned the confederate right and and given Hooker some idea that Jackson was up to something.

Now with that in mind, (and this is in no way a defense), Sickles in his mind might have thought he was seeing the same thing all over again. Being an aggressive commander, (for all the wrong reasons), perhaps he thought that by moving further West he would be able to establish what was in front of him. If Lee decided to go around the Union right and he left no significant force in front of Sickles, then Sickles could flank the ANV. Not a bad plan really if it had Meade's blessing. What happened was when Sickles realized what was happening, it was way to late. As soon as he detected movement to his left, he needed to make the decision to return to his original position. He didn't and III Corps paid for it with their lives, suffering so many casualties that the Corp was disbanded.

Just my opinion for what it's worth.

Regards,

Greg B)

Gfran64 wrote:

Remembering that Sickles was not a West Pointer, (he was the only AOP Corps commander who wasn't), he was learning on the fly. Now the last major battle he was in was Chancellorsville. Remember what happened there. Jackson was to his front. Jackson completely vacated his position there for his attack on the Union right which crumbled just about the entire AOP. Sickles was on fairly bad ground and reported that he didn't think Jackson was in front of him anymore and asked permission to advance which was denied. If he was given that opportunity he may have turned the confederate right and and given Hooker some idea that Jackson was up to something.

Now with that in mind, (and this is in no way a defense), Sickles in his mind might have thought he was seeing the same thing all over again. Being an aggressive commander, (for all the wrong reasons), perhaps he thought that by moving further West he would be able to establish what was in front of him. If Lee decided to go around the Union right and he left no significant force in front of Sickles, then Sickles could flank the ANV. Not a bad plan really if it had Meade's blessing. What happened was when Sickles realized what was happening, it was way to late. As soon as he detected movement to his left, he needed to make the decision to return to his original position. He didn't and III Corps paid for it with their lives, suffering so many casualties that the Corp was disbanded.

Just my opinion for what it's worth.

Regards,

Greg B)

I agree with this, but he did move forward after his skirmishers made contact. I'm still not sure why he did that.

DrMike1997 wrote:

You know what is great about this Sickles was right/wrong argument?
Pretty soon we will be able to run some great experiments to see for ourselves!

By any chance are there scenarios in game that take a what if Sickles behaved
starting point?

Very true, very true.

DrMike1997 wrote:

You know what is great about this Sickles was right/wrong argument?
Pretty soon we will be able to run some great experiments to see for ourselves!

By any chance are there scenarios in game that take a what if Sickles behaved
starting point?

You remember all too well how my mind works from CWBR days.

-Jim