Union Retreat

[BOSTON]

Greg

Would those be What ifs?

Hoistingman4

Skip that question, found a list of CW battles they were not on it.

[ReinhartGamersAt]

Regarding Lt Gen. Longstreet:

Prior to the campaign that lead to the battle of Gettysburg, Longstreet presented a plan to Lee and the Richmond government that was designed to relieve pressure from Grant on Vicksburg. He, like everyone else, knew that loosing Vicksburg would have the disastrous effect of closing the Confederacy's overland link to the states of Arkansas, Texas, and most of Louisiana, and sealing the Mississippi from use by the Confederacy. And Longstreet knew that the loss of the important rail center of Chattanooga wouldn't be far behind if Vicksburg would fall.

But Longstreet's plan was not adopted. The strategy that was employed was Lee's own plan to invade the North. It was designed to relieve the war-torn Virginia and push the war to nothern soil. In addition to that Lee wanted to threaten major Northern cities and in doing so to be able to relieve other parts of the Confederacy then under pressure from Ulysses S. Grant and William S. Rosecrans. As you see while Longstreet had argued for a more "direct relief", Lee seemed to believe that one of these armies would be compelled to move east and assist the Army of the Potomac if the Confederates were able to threaten major Northern cities.

The first two days at Gettysburg went in favour for the Confederates - it is said that the Union commander was already contemplating a retreat, fearing for the loss of his forces (regardless of the strong position he occupied).

As you know on the third day of battle General Robert E. Lee ordered a massive infantry assault on the Union central positions on Cemetery Ridge in the firm believe that his troops could break the Federal line - an attack that was later christened "Pickett's Charge". Its futility was predicted by the charge's commander, Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, who tried to persuade Lee of different apporaches throughout the whole 3 days and pleaded for flank attacks and a repositioning of the ANV for several times. But Lee would not be pursuaded and Longstreet had to do his duty. Pickett's Charge is a much discussed topic and opinions differ. A thing that is very interesting and should tell us a lot is that Lee NEVER criticized Longstreet (who also was at Lee's side 'til the very end of the war). What's more is that Lee is said to have blamed himself for what has happened that day. It was arguably an avoidable mistake from which the Southern war effort never fully recovered psychologically.

Also you have to remember that many things have gone awry in this campaign for the Confederate Army. Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, who was in charge of the cavalry, left the ANV blind for a very long time. Longstreet was informed by one of his paid scouts of the Unions advance.
On the first day of battle, after the Federals had been pushed through the town they retreated to the high ground south of town at Cemetery Hill. Lee understood at once the defensive potential to the Union if they held on to this high ground. He thus sent orders to General Ewell that Cemetery Hill be taken "if practicable". Alas Ewell chose not to attempt the assault (a great missed opportunity that might as well have changed the outcome of the battle), which prompted Gen. Isaac R. Trimble - who tried to persuade Ewell in vain to attack - to threw down his sword in disgust and storm off.
Lee also expected an early start for the 3rd days attack but it took all morning to arrange the infantry assault force. The reason for that seems to be that neither Lee's nor Longstreet's headquarters sent orders to Pickett to order him to have his division on the battlefield by early daylight. It remains unclear if this was a mistake, an oversight, or a plain misunderstanding of Lee's verbal order. After the war Longstreet was criticised for this negligence and many even clamed that it is an evidence that Longstreet deliberately undermined Lee's plan for the battle.
All in all Lee had many new and inexperienced commanders when he made his way toward Gettysburg: Neither Gen. Hill nor Gen. Ewell, though both where doubtless capable division commanders, had any experience commanding a whole corps! Gen. Trimble, (who stepped in to replace W. Dorsey Pender, of A.P. Hill's Corps, who was mortally wounded the previous day) was at a great disadvantage too, because he had never worked with the troops assigned to him before. Also, Lee's method of giving generalized orders ( "if practicable" ) and leaving it up to his lieutenants to work out the details proved inadequate when dealing with inexperienced corps commanders unused to Lee's style of command.

As for what would have happened after a Confederate victory? My guess is that the Union morale would have dropped beyond any will to go on with the war. With Lee in a position to threaten 3 major cities convincing the Union government that a continued war was useless and that it was best to engage in peace talks. I think it might as well have won the CSA it's freedom in the long run. Alas it was the first step on the long road to it's defeat.

[BOSTON]

It's good to hear members share their knowledge with the community, makes for good reading, and for those already familiar with the subject, it might refresh your memory and give you a different take from what you knew in the past. To me doing articles like Reinhart's is time consuming work. To anybody who takes to the task, "My hat is off to YA!" Thanks (Danka), Hoistingman4

[ironsight]

Longstreet's own words from his memoirs:

"After reporting to Gen. Lee, I offered the suggestion made to Secretary Seddon, in regard to the means that should be adopted for the relief of Vicksburg. I thought that honor, interest, duty and humanity called us to that service...
I suggested that Gen. Johnston, instead of trying to collect an army against Gen. Grant, should be sent to reenforce Gen. Bragg then standing against the Union forces under Gen. Rosecrans in middle Tennessee; that at the same time he should send my Divisions, just up from Suffolk, to join Johnston's reinforcements to Bragg's Army; that the combination once made should strike immediately in overwhelming force upon Rosecrans, and march for the Ohio River and Cincinnati."

"In the absence of orders, I had scouting parties out during the night in search of a way by which we might strike the enemy's left and push it down his center. I found a way that gave promise of results, and was about to move the command, when he (Lee) rode over after sunrise and gave his orders. His plan was to assault the enemy's left center..I thought that would not do; that the point had been fully tested the day before, by more men, when all were fresh; that the enemy was there looking for us, as we heard him during the night putting up his defences...
..that 30,000 men was the minimum of force necessary for the work...
..that column as he proposed would only have about 13,000 men; that the column would have to march a mile under concentrating battery fire, and a thousand yards under long range musketry;...
Opinion was then expressed that the 15,000 men who could make successful assault over that field had never been arrayed for battle; but he was impatient of listening, and tired of talking, and nothing was left to proceed."

"40,000 men, unsupported as we were, could not have carried the position at Gettysburg. The enemy was there. Officers and men knew their advantage, and were resolved to stay until the hills came down over them. It is simply out of the question for a lesser force to march over broad open fields and carry a fortified front occupied by a greater force of seasoned troops."

[BOSTON]

Gotta go out and fire up the loader, snow is piling up,-write you later.

[BOSTON]

Longstreets' plan sounded like it would have been a MO FO for the Union. That What-if would of been absolutely phenominal :cheer: to do. Hindsight is always 20/20 at this time and age of things that get done so easily.

Why was Lee in such a rush? Was there developments prompting him to do so? or was it just lack of scouting that caused him to under/over estimate his decison? Is there information on that thought process?

Good Work, Hoistingman4

Gotta go out and plow again

[ironsight]

First of all Lee was suffering from sciatica(sp?) and the trotts at Gburg. He wanted a victory of some kind on Norhern territory even if it was a lesser one. His artillery ammo was running low, his supplies were running low and there he was dug in on the 2nd day and lets not forget in Northern territory with the Federalis reenforcing by the hour with fresh units and supplies from Washington.

He had to do something and quick. Retreat at that point was out of the question. I truly believe Lee as originally intended knew in no way he could seriously threaten Washington at the outcome of the 2nd day of battle. His best hope was to route or cause the Yankees to retreat on the 3rd day as he'd done times before in previous battles.
Over confidence? probably..a blind eye to the reality confronting him? perhaps!

Time and time again, the strategic objective to move troops to threaten the enemy elsewhere in order to move the enemy did not work well during the war.
Hood's movement to Tennessee to get Sherman to pursue him there, Lee's Pennsylvania campaign to threaten either Pittsburg or Washington in order to get Grant to quit his Vicksburg seige and pursue. General Early's 3rd and final major 'Washington threatening' invasion of the North in order to get Grant to quit his seige on Petersburg or divert large numbers of his troops to protect Washington..none of them worked as planned. Grant did however divert some of his forces from Petersburg to protect Washington from Early's invasion but not nowhere near the numbers the Confederacy hoped for.

IMO, having the advantage of Monday morning quarterbacking, i would of gone with Longstreet's plan but with a twist. I would of combined the forces Jonhston mustered along with Bragg's forces and add to that a Division or two of Longstreet's corp.
Attack Rosecran in force and once he retreated then either lay seige or attack Grant at Vicksburg. Rosecran's Army if regrouped or reenforced could be checkmated by elements of the main Confederate Army under Lee who would still be in the area protecting Richmond from the rest of the Federal Army.

The real defeat during Lee's Pennsylvania campaign was not at Gettysburg but at Vicksburg.

[BOSTON]

In 1963 How long would it take to transport Longstreets' corp/div to Mid Tennassee to make a difference in that campaign? Something tells me it would'nt of been overnight. presuming his corp were in Pennsylvainia with one rail line available if any. At the same time Lee would have had to start his withdrawal (with Pickets' Div intact). Lee would of still had a potent force. Meade would have to be second guessing Lee's next move and remain stuck in defensive fortifications put up at Gettysburg till he realized that Lee was gone. Was there any offense by the Union at GB? Did'nt seem like it, only reactions to Lee's jabs. Did Stuart ever make it to GB? I knew he was late, but how late? It would of been great had they got away. Another What-if?

[ReinhartGamersAt]

Just checked Longstreets book for an answer to that: It took about 9-10 days to move his troops from Virginia to Tennassee before the battle of Chickamauga (October 1863). Reason for this was the re-rout that had to be taken: "...through the Carolinas to Augusta, Georgia, and up by the railroad, thence to Atlanta to Dalton and Ringgold.". Also you may not forget that the railroad track sizes differed, so the troops had to move from one train to the next. In another part he also mentiones that, under normal circumstances, the journey would have taken about 2 days.

All in all six brigades of Longstreet's 1st Corps were scheduled to arrive on September 18, 1863. Three of these brigades, under General John Bell Hood's command, would arrive on the morning of the 18th. Longstreet, along with two more brigades, would arrive on the evening of the 19th. Due to the roundabout route from Virginia to Georgia, the sixth brigade (E. P. Alexander's artillery) would not arrive in time for the battle as it arrived on the 25th of September. As for the duration: According to General Longstreets account the first troops boarded the train on the 9th of September at Orange Court-House.


As for why Lee attacked it think ironsight might be right there he didn't see any other chance AND I guess that he really thought his troops where nearly incinvible because they had won battle after battle and he was sure they would do it again, no matter what odds stood against them. It might have been better to go along with Longstreets plan and flank the Union army and draw it away from it's position - for they would have been forced to move if the rebels had relocated. But who knows what that would have done to morale? On the other hand, the hit the Confederation suffered from the Gettysburg defeat was definitely massive.

[dale]

I think Lee was trapped by his own successes. In 1862 he was able to get a whole corps diverted from McClellan's Peninsula army to protect against a feint to Washington. McDowell was supposed to be McClellan's northernmost force of his army. Lincoln and his cabinent ordered the McDowell's forces to the north, thus giving Lee an opening to hook Jackson's men around the Union right flank and start the destruction of McClellan's morale. At Gettysburg Lee was not able to feint troops away from the Union army.

Prior to Gettysburg Lee had bested McClellan, Pope, Burnside and Hooker. The Union generals had started offensives against him and thus were at a disadvantage of having to face a foe that had shorter interior lines. Lee used this strategic and tactical advantage to maneuver his troops to critical points where his forces would outnumber the enemy at the point of Lee's chosing even though the enemy had a greater overall number of men. Once Lee had the advantage at one point on the battlefield he would seize the initiative and not let go of it. The two exceptions to this were Fredricksburg where Lee had time to prepare a battlefield for a rather static defensive stand and Antietam where he used his reserves to plug holes all day long.

At Gettysburg Lee once again saw a chance to seize the initiative, thinking that because his forces were more concentrated than the Federal forces he could assimilate them quicker than his foe and force the issue on an outnumbered part of the Federal army. But I think that Lee failed to realize how many factors had changed. First, he was facing a Union general that was not prone to panic and who did not have grand illusions of his own brilliance. Second, because of Stuart's absence he did not realize how quickly the Union army was able to concentrate. Third, the Union now had the inner defensive line and was able to shuttle troops quicker to hot spots than the Confederates could. It would take Longstreet many hours to get his men in position to attack a flank--thus limiting the options for Lee on Day 3. On Day 2 Longstreet was not able to allow Hood to attack from the true flank of Big Round Top because of the time needed to position his forces there. The grand flanking maneuvers that had worked at the Seven Days Battles, Chancellorsville and Second Manassass were too expensive in terms of time at Gettysburg. When they were attempted they were done with very tired troops and with inadequate forces to drive the enemy's flank.

Lee was a general who believed that once you had the initiative you could not let the foe regain it. This was why he risked his army at Gettysburg. Jackson had shared Lee's vision of how a battle should be fought. It demanded initiative from Lee's corp commanders and it demanded ceaseless determination and drive once the pivot point was reached. I have no doubt that had Jackson been present on Day 1 the Union would have been off of Cemetary Ridge by that night. The Union forces would not have been able to consolidate because the issue would have been in flux since Gettysburg at that point would not have become a static defensive battleground for the North.

Longstreet had years of hindsight when he wrote his memoirs. Did Lee ask the impossible of him on Day 2? Perhaps, because Longstreet was not able to get into the right position to exert his maximum affect. (Sickles may have inadvertantly forced the issue of where the attack was to come by advancing his position.) Could Lee have had a better result if he had delayed Longstreet's Day 2 attacks? I think so, but that would have not been in Lee's character. Lee had no use for generals who did not attack.

So the big controversey is why did Lee attack the center on Day 3? I think that Lee was convinced that he could put the most amount of force on the center. By this time the North had gathered all of its troops and could keep extending the flanks if needed in order to keep a flanking force from coming against it. If Lee had chosen to march Longstreets corp around one of the two flanks he would of had to weaken his own center in the face of larger enemy. He could mask his movements at Chancellorsville, but not here. If Meade had gone on to the attack while Lee was attempting a large flanking maneuver the results could have been devastating for Lee's weakened center, because the Army of Northern Virginia would now have been split in two, in enemy territory. By the dawn of Day 3 Lee must have realized how limited his options had become. The initiative had already swung in favor of the static Meade, who now had the advantage of inner lines, high ground, more troops, and defensive artillery. By doing nothing more than assembling his army on high ground he became the beneficiary of so many advantages previous Union generals never had. Lee could not acknowledge that he was already strategically beaten by the dawn of Day 3. The only choice that Lee had in his own mind was the choice of where to attack and yet his options were limited. He refused to heed Longstreet's admonitions of going on the defensive because that would result in ceding to the enemy the initiative. The visions of the successful frontal assault of Gaines Mill against a massed force must have given him hope at this point. In my mind he ordered the assault against the center without reservation. Pickett's charge was the result. Longstreet in the end gets the last word.