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If Longstreet really tries to gain the Union rear to get east of the RT's to place artillery in the rear of the AOP he has to fully separate from the rest of the ANV. Now he has III in his front with V in support and II offering III aid as needed. He is also going to have VI arriving in his rear late in the day and that puts Longstreet in a very bad spot. If I'm Meade, I split the ANV right behind where Longstreet left and keep it that way. You could force Longstreet back into Maryland where he would pick up Pickett and just hammer Hill and Ewell forcing them to the west. I don't see how Longstreet could have gotten around the Union left without fully separating from Lee. I think his desired movement was more of a feint toward Washington to get Meade to reposition his army. Just my opinion.

Regards,

Greg B)

I think the best the Confederates could have hoped for by seizing LRT was Meade retreating to more favorable ground elsewhere....though more AoP corps would be arriving in Longstreet's rear

To me Culp's hill would be a much more valuable ground to seize and Ewell not taking it is the ultimate 'what if' scenario to ponder.

Gfran64 wrote:

If Longstreet really tries to gain the Union rear to get east of the RT's to place artillery in the rear of the AOP he has to fully separate from the rest of the ANV. Now he has III in his front with V in support and II offering III aid as needed. He is also going to have VI arriving in his rear late in the day and that puts Longstreet in a very bad spot. If I'm Meade, I split the ANV right behind where Longstreet left and keep it that way. You could force Longstreet back into Maryland where he would pick up Pickett and just hammer Hill and Ewell forcing them to the west. I don't see how Longstreet could have gotten around the Union left without fully separating from Lee. I think his desired movement was more of a feint toward Washington to get Meade to reposition his army. Just my opinion.

Regards,

Greg B)

Hi Greg!

I wasn't saying to main assaut east of RT, but west of RT to the middle (Meade's HQ) to shrink the CS front, allowing more divisions to support Longstreet's attack. Guns on LRT were to protect the right flank of the assault, with Stewart further to the east to add confusion, possibly prevent other US corps from deploying. As far as an aggressive counter move by Meade, I don't think Meade would have rolled the dice.

BOSTON

You also have to keep in mind that on July 2nd, neither side had a true grasp of the disposition of the enemy.

Longstreet knew that the Yankees were in force around Culps and Cemetery Hills, but he really didn't truly know how far that line extended southward. He was making an educated guess as to where the Federal flank would be and his goal was to catch them on that flank and roll the line right up to Cemetery Hill.

When the assault began, Longstreet was really at his most "isolated". The momentum of his attack was designed to drive him back towards Cemetery Hill. It's also here where we need to remember that the Round Tops were on Longstreet's far right. Capturing them would anchor his flank, but I really don't know if he ever had the intention to drive east of the Round Tops.

Lee (and Longstreet) knew that Meade was gathered in MD, so Longstreet had to assume that multiple Corps were transiting up the Baltimore Pike and Taneytown Road. I doubt that Longstreet wanted to tangle with a couple of Union Corps on the east side of the Round Tops. However, if he could gain those hills and set up defensive positions there, he would be more than happy to have those Corps attack his troops up those slopes. But again, this was all a side show to the main assault driving towards Cemetery Hill.

I'm also sure that Longstreet spent much of that afternoon looking over his right shoulder down the Emmitsburg Road - hoping not to see the dust clouds of a Blue infantry column. In fact, that might make a nice "what if" scenario. What if a Union division came marching up the Emmitsburg Road during the height of Longstreet's attack?

JReynolds wrote:

I think the best the Confederates could have hoped for by seizing LRT was Meade retreating to more favorable ground elsewhere....though more AoP corps would be arriving in Longstreet's rear

To me Culp's hill would be a much more valuable ground to seize and Ewell not taking it is the ultimate 'what if' scenario to ponder.

So you would like to see a "What-if?", that has Ewell on day 1 assaulting Culp's Hill. It would have to be without the breastworks on the map.

Yah, I think that Culp's Hill on Day 1 is interesting to me. If Ewell had seized the heights promptly, the whole ground of the battle would have changed. How do you think the battle would have progress, or would Meade decide not to attack? What ground would have been the most important for both sides?

JReynolds wrote:

Yah, I think that Culp's Hill on Day 1 is interesting to me. If Ewell had seized the heights promptly, the whole ground of the battle would have changed. How do you think the battle would have progress, or would Meade decide not to attack? What ground would have been the most important for both sides?

Maybe someone like AJ would know when (time of day) US occupied Culp's Hill on day 1, and what would be the earliest time that Ewell would have been able to assault CH.

Rich Mac wrote:

You also have to keep in mind that on July 2nd, neither side had a true grasp of the disposition of the enemy.

Longstreet knew that the Yankees were in force around Culps and Cemetery Hills, but he really didn't truly know how far that line extended southward. He was making an educated guess as to where the Federal flank would be and his goal was to catch them on that flank and roll the line right up to Cemetery Hill.

When the assault began, Longstreet was really at his most "isolated". The momentum of his attack was designed to drive him back towards Cemetery Hill. It's also here where we need to remember that the Round Tops were on Longstreet's far right. Capturing them would anchor his flank, but I really don't know if he ever had the intention to drive east of the Round Tops.

Lee (and Longstreet) knew that Meade was gathered in MD, so Longstreet had to assume that multiple Corps were transiting up the Baltimore Pike and Taneytown Road. I doubt that Longstreet wanted to tangle with a couple of Union Corps on the east side of the Round Tops. However, if he could gain those hills and set up defensive positions there, he would be more than happy to have those Corps attack his troops up those slopes. But again, this was all a side show to the main assault driving towards Cemetery Hill.

I'm also sure that Longstreet spent much of that afternoon looking over his right shoulder down the Emmitsburg Road - hoping not to see the dust clouds of a Blue infantry column. In fact, that might make a nice "what if" scenario. What if a Union division came marching up the Emmitsburg Road during the height of Longstreet's attack?

First off it would be a disaster for Longstreet, secondly, I don't think there was any major Union troop movements on the Emmitsburg road day 1 or 2 or 3, not till the 5th I think, after Lee's retreat. I got a feeling I got alot of reading to do. :laugh:

JReynolds wrote:

Yah, I think that Culp's Hill on Day 1 is interesting to me. If Ewell had seized the heights promptly, the whole ground of the battle would have changed. How do you think the battle would have progress, or would Meade decide not to attack? What ground would have been the most important for both sides?

Just read that Johnson's tired division would have had to attack CH in the dark against a beaten up 1st corp, 11th next to it, with US reinforcements arriving during the night.

My 2 cents:

1. Longstreet was not supposed to take the round tops. Lee said the Union line was nowhere near those hills, and for some reason, only gave Longstreet the right to attack up the Emmitsburg road. However, when the problem arose with artillery found in the peach orchard (there was only supposed to be infantry) and a brigade at Devil's Den, Lee hurried forward and decided to let Hood secure his flank at the Little Round Top. This resulted in two West to East drives by Hood's Division, then McLaws' one, with the goal of piercing the Union salient, then turning on the Emmitsburg Road and driving to the Cemetary. Little did they know that the entire V Corps was moving into position behind the III Corps. So, if Sickles decided to stay along Cemetary Ridge, there would be three outcomes:
a) Lee would decide to not attack the defensive position and waits until Pickett arrives the next day too attack (I understand, though, he actually arrived late that night.)
b) Longstreet orders his attack to proceed, west to east, in hopes of breaking the line and turning it (similar to Pickett's charge, except on the flank).
c) Lee lets Longstreet flank the round tops, like at Chancellorsville, and drives directly south to north up the Union line. However, this would be difficult with the V and VI Corps arriving on his flank or refusing the line at LRT.

2. If Ewell had sent any troops anywhere, it was going to be Cemetary Hill. When Johnston's division arrived in position to go up Culps' Hill, it was 1 am according to my sources. By then, the XII Corps was arriving and the division left along Brinkerhoff ridge would have been on the flank of the advance (this leads to the detachment of the Stonewall Brigade during the first two days). So the question is: was there enough troops on hand to take Cemetary Hill? I believe, no. In Gringich's Gettysburg, Henry Hunt arrives with a few reserve batteries (I don't know if he actually did or not, but it is possible) and is able to plant over 60 guns near or on the hill. (I Corps had 28 or so, the XI Corps with 30...). Ammunition from the reserve artillery limbers arriving throughout the evening and night would have been able to supply those guns, and there was the entire I Corps (though cut to pieces), a fair amount of the XI Corps, and a fresh brigade from the XI Corps to defend the hill. In addition, the XII Corps was marching to the position, and would have made any attack facing most of 3 Corps. Lee's only fresh brigades were in Anderson's Division, 2 in Pender, Johnston's very late brigades (arriving at midnight or so), and some other minor units (Smith's Brigade). Considering these 8 brigades or so, having to deploy, march across the fields of Pickett's charge, then up the Cemetary in the face of infantry and artillery fire? Pickett couldn't do it with hours of preparation, the consequences could very well be another Malvern Hill. So no, Lee's only chance was to defeat the I and XI Corps, then charge right along their coattails to the Cemetary. With the Union holding the high ground, tens of thousands of men on the way as well, it would be a stretch for Lee to win the battle after Day 1.

Again, my 2 cents.