Scourge of War Boards

Sure, Buford was definitly the right man at the right time.

However, I don't believe that you can say Heth did a terrible job. With the minimal amount of Union Cavalry that he saw, there was no need to deploy his entire two front brigades. However, I would like to say that the commander of the outpost regiment did a VERY GOOD JOB on delaying the enemy skirmishers. Under no orders from Gamble, he held three successive lines until Herr's ridge until the Confederate skirmishers lapped around his flanks and nearly surrounded him before he pulled back.

Heth, in his way, didn't start the battle of Gettysburg, either. He did a great job of containing himself after his first two brigades were chewed up, and didn't counter-assault when the situation presented itself (with the remaining two brigades, which would easily overrun the used-up and jumbled up Iron Brigade, and make short work of the three regiments on lower McPhearson ridge. From my sources, it indicates that Ewell actually started the battle, because Lee saw Ewell's troops being demolished near the Willis' Woods, and decided to stop the Federals from reinforcing that flank.

Buford, though a great cavalry leader when it came down to it, probably had less to do with the Confederate defeat than most people give him credit. However, he performed extremely well at the big cavalry battle (somewhere in Virginia, I forgot).

However, Buford did scout out the area the night before and decided to provide a defense in depth on both fronts, with the single outpost regiment way in the front, and Gamble's brigade near McPhearson ridge. I would prefer to say that the commander of the outpost regiment really had more to say about the delaying of Heth than Buford did (though Gamble did help by creating Herr's ridge as a strong point).

After reading about the Battle of Gettysburg, I can't help but think it never should've been fought beyond day 1. Longstreet was right, in suggesting they disengage and find better ground. If the Rebs had taken Cemetary Hill on day1,it may have put them in a better situation. Lee's actions read like, he was not himself. At least not based on the previous battles he fought.

The glaring issue about the Confederate position on day2 was contrary to basic military tactics. And that was the Confederate line was longer than the Union line, with fewer men in those respective lines. One of the estimates I read about day2, after Sedgwick's men arrived, tabbed Meade's force at around 80,000 effectives, and Lee's at around 50,000. And the tactical deployment of the two forces extended the odds against Lee. Meade's 51 brigades of infantry and 7 of cavalry were available to occupy three miles of line. That averaged 27,000 men to a mile, or more than fifteen to a yard. Lee's 34 brigades of infantry were placed along a five mile simi-circle for an average of 10,000 men to the mile, and fewer than six men per yard. Meade also had 354 guns, 118 per mile, Lee had 272 guns, or 54 per mile.

Lee's position wasn't favorable for attacking, nor was it ideal for defense. Had the Confederates managed a breakthrough anywhere along the Union line, I seriously doubt they could've exploited it. Even at Little Round Top, had Oats' regiment pushed Chamberlain's back, I don't believe they had the numbers available in that quarter of the field, to fully take advantage of the position.(an issue that was a recuring problem for the ANV throughout the whole war, in my opinion)

I have a great deal of respect for Lee, but I'll never understand his thinking on day3. I don't even want to speculate why he planned the attack on day3. It defies logic, and all one can do is guess at it.

In the "For What Its Worth" department, from the epic biography of R. E. Lee by Douglas Southall Freeman:

Vol. III, p. 160: "When the war had ended, General Lee was still reticent in writing or speaking to strangers about Gettysburg or about any other of his battles, and never went further than to say to them that if the assault could have been coordinated success could have been attained." In the footnote to this quote, Lee had written: "As to the battle of Gettysburg, I must again refer you to my official accounts. Its loss was occasioned by a combination of circumstances. It was commenced in the absence of correct intelligence. It was continued in the effort to overcome the difficulties by which we were surrounded, and it would have been gained could one determined and united blow have been delivered by our line. As it was, victory trembled in the balance for three days, and the battle resulted in the infliction of as great amount of injury as was received and frustrating the Federal campaign for the season."

General Lee later spoke with General "Harry" Heth: "Lee expressed conviction tht the invasion of Pennsylvania was sound policy, and said that he again would enter that state if able to do so. He also remarked to Heth, when the dicta of the arm-chair strategists were under discussion, 'After it is all over, as stupid a fellow as I am can see the mistakes that were made. I notice, however, that my mistakes are never told me untils it is too late, and you, and all my officers, know that I am always ready and anxious to have their suggestions.'" Again, from page 160.

Kerflumoxed wrote:
[quote]In the "For What Its Worth" department, from the epic biography of R. E. Lee by Douglas Southall Freeman:

As it was, victory trembled in the balance for three days, and the battle resulted in the infliction of as great amount of injury as was received and frustrating the Federal campaign for the season."quote]

That's an interesting one. I had never read this before. So Lee took some consolation that he had frustrated the Federal summer campaign in 1863... In the end, I am guessing that the Army of the Potomac was fairly satisfied with the outcome and got a significant boost in morale, despite not actually doing the "On to Richmond" thing during the summer.

I don't think the self-realization that the Army of the Potomac could actually beat the Army of Northern Virginia is to be under-rated, especially given that the army had just lost a lot of two-year and nine-month regiments. Frustrating the campaign for the season seems like an early attempt at spin.

General Howard-

I suppose if it was anyone BUT Lee, spin might be an appropriate judgement of the motivation behind the "frustrating the campaign" comment. However, I tend to believe this not to be the case. Rather, I view it as only a pragmatic response. Could be wrong, though! :unsure:

Incidentally, Freeman gives 5 reasons for the Confederate failure at Gettysburg:
1. Failure of Stuart to provide the necessary intelligence of the "enemy's" movement;
2. Failure of Ewell to take Cemetary Hill on the afternoon of 1 July;
3. Extent and "thinness" of the Confederate line, slightly more than 5 miles in length;
4. State of mind of subordinate commanders like Longstreet's sulking, Ewell indecision;
5. General lack of coordination in attack by the post-Chancellorsville reorganized army. To quote Freeman in one example: "Longstreet could have had Pickett on the field at dawn and could have attacked when Ewell did; but he was still so intent on carrying his own point and moving by the right flank, that he devoted himself to that plan instead of hurrying Pickett into position. When Longstreet would not attack with his whole corps, Lee made the mistake of shifting his attack northward, and of delivering it with parts of two corps." (Vol. III, p. 151)

Golly...aren't hypotheticals great! :woohoo:

J

I agree with Ephrum...days 2 and 3 shouldn't have happened. Rebs should of gotten their 'gettysburg shoes', and headed towards DC. Feds would have had to pursue, Rebs pick their defensive ground as they lay siege to DC...interesting idea for an extensive mod...if the campaign maps were made available...Oh...the possibilities.

RebBugler wrote:

I agree with Ephrum...days 2 and 3 shouldn't have happened. Rebs should of gotten their 'gettysburg shoes', and headed towards DC. Feds would have had to pursue, Rebs pick their defensive ground as they lay siege to DC...interesting idea for an extensive mod...if the campaign maps were made available...Oh...the possibilities.

But then we'd only have 1 days worth of battle to replay instead of 3 days. Or maybe the Pipe Creek Battle.

Even if campaign maps were available, there would still have to be the tactical maps on which to fight the battles for wherever on the campaign maps you decide to fight it out. Wouldn't there?

Has anyone read Newt Gingrich's Gettysburg Series?

That should answer your questions in these books:
Gettysburg
Grant Comes East
Never Call Retreat

Very good collection, read them a lot. Personal stories (based off of actual happenings) and events that relate directly to later cases in the war, a little interesting, because you get the commander before he made those decisions.

Hancock the Superb wrote:

Has anyone read Newt Gingrich's Gettysburg Series?

That should answer your questions in these books:
Gettysburg
Grant Comes East
Never Call Retreat

Very good collection, read them a lot. Personal stories (based off of actual happenings) and events that relate directly to later cases in the war, a little interesting, because you get the commander before he made those decisions.

I agree Hancock about these books.

I read them and enjoyed them alot !!!

Chamberlain

My conclusions are absolutely based on hindsight. But I came to those conclusions from the many books I've been reading from in the last two weeks. Being that I wasn't there at the time, reading about it is all I can do.

Longstreet suggested to Lee, each day of the battle, reasons why they shouldn't be making that fight. That in itself is why I don't really buy into what Lee said to Heth, in regards to his mistakes never being told to him.

I'll keep reading more on the battle, but I don't think there's really anything new about the battle, that suggests that ANV had a chance of victory, after day1, with Lee's plans.

The only thing I'm not completely sure of, was Longstreet really dragging his feet....sulking, because he couldn't get Lee to listen to him? And if so, was that the reason he treated Hood's plea's, to not attack as ordered, the same way Lee reacted to Longstreet's argument. McLaws and Hood knew that their attack ordrers on day2, were not a good idea, based on what they saw before them. Or at least, they knew that their orders were based on incorrect info of the Union position. But like Lee, Longstreet just seemed to not want to hear it.