Dear All
This post relates to creating a linked series of asymmetric Waterloo campaign battles and initially the logistics issues.
Professor David Kirkpatrick has published an interesting paper on the Waterloo campaign on the web here
He uses modern decision analysis technique to suggest how Napoleon might have improved his chances of success despite him not being able to know which strategic options Wellington and Blucher might adopt. In fact of course you do not really have to make too complicated an analysis to reach a conclusion that what Napoleon required was a series of asymmetric battles in which he could annihilate his enemies in detail. This was what he attempted but at both Ligny and Waterloo he allocated too great a proportion of his army to the masking forces.
My planned series of battle is intended to test whether he could have succeeded if he had effectively allocated only a single corps of infantry plus one or two of cavalry to each of his two wings with his main force comprising 4 x infantry corps plus one of cavalry. He did of course allow himself flexibility to move units between the wings and the reserve but that did give rise to confusion in both Ney and Grouchy as to whether their role was to fight and win victories or hold back the enemy.
I am interested to hear from any of you who have studied the campaign whether there might have been another consideration in his initial allocation. Might the road net in Belgium in 1815 have been a major factor? For example how much longer would the “reserve” with 2 extra corps take to move down a road?
As part of my asymmetric campaign set I am currently testing a mod for Waterloo which has Napoleon with two extra infantry corps at Waterloo. Thus Grouchy only has 2 x cavalry corps and 2 x infantry divisions to shadow and impede the Prussians. However, if I assume that before this the campaign unfolded historically, would Napoleon have been able to get 2 additional infantry corps down the road from Quatre Bras given that his army did not even start down that road until well into the afternoon? Timing becomes a bigger issue if Grouchy is only capable of impeding rather than halting the Prussians.
My key questions are:
1) How far could a 20k corps march on a paved road per hour?
2) How long would it be before a second corps could start to use the same road?
3) Same two questions for a minor road net e.g. from Wavre to Plancenoit
4) Could either a cavalry or an infantry corps actually travel entirely off road assuming no river obstacle?
Regards
Mike
Asymmetric Campaign Battles
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Saddletank
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Re: Asymmetric Campaign Battles
Interesting discussion.
1) How far could a 20k corps march on a paved road per hour?
2) How long would it be before a second corps could start to use the same road?
3) Same two questions for a minor road net e.g. from Wavre to Plancenoit
4) Could either a cavalry or an infantry corps actually travel entirely off road assuming no river obstacle?
I have run numerous pen-and-paper and PBEM campaigns in my time and I have found that a rate of movement that seems to cover the historical *average* march distances of most armies of the horse-drawn era in Europe is between 10 and 15 miles a day. For short periods on good roads troops could move more rapidly though. A lot depended on the road net, terrain, weather and skill of the command team.
1) MPH move rates are impossible to state because so many factors can affect speed of march. You should think in terms of miles per day as a minimum. I'd say 10 to 15. I think Napoleon would assume his corps could cover 20 miles a day in exceptional circumstances over good roads but I personally feel this is optimistic and troops moving at such rates would quickly outpace their supporting traffic columns.
2) Wellington's march instructions of 1815 show columns of march with the heavy baggage of each corps ordered to move at the tail of *all* the corps, so the fighting elements of all the corps would go first. The troops would thus reach a days end destination and have more time to rest while the heavy baggage came up in the night. Rather than the way you phrase it, a better question is "how soon can a second corps arrive at the same destination as the first in a fit state to go into combat"? Throwing corps after corps piecemeal into a battle is no way to fight and hope to be able to control how a battle flows. Gettysburg is a good example of the kind of inconclusive or chaotic battle that can develop if corps are put into action as they arrive. Ideally an army commander would want to assemble all the corps he needed for a battle on the battlefield the evening before his intended fight. So I would answer your question by saying this is the wrong question to ask as its answer isn't useful no matter how long it takes. In order to let a commander retain the fullest control he needs to orchestrate a major battle he would want all his corps all ready to go into action at dawn of the day of battle. The leading troops of Bluchers Prussians actually reached Frichermont woods around 9:00am on the 18th June but his corps were not able to significantly put effort into the battle until 7 or 8 hours later; so a corps that arrives on the day of battle is rarely able to achieve its full potential.
3) Minor roads were avoided as much as possible. It took Bluchers troops I think 9 hours to cover the 4 miles from Wavre to Smohain where they began to affect Napoleon's decision making due to their proximity to Mont St Jean. I recommend Peter Hofschroer's books on the 1815 fighting on this aspect as he covers in detail the Prussian march rates and the terrain their men had to negotiate.
4) No. Major formations never travelled off roads as the chances of losing the way and of couriers being unable to find them to deliver instructions multiply. If a corps is strung out down a road the corps commander, his division commanders and the army commander all know where to send couriers - along that road. Once a corps goes across country the potential for delayed communication rises to a level that it becomes impractical to co-ordinate any kind of grand tactical moves. A corps going across country has no waypoints to aim for. Using a road network was the only way to achieve any kind of certainty as to where you were in the days before clear accurate large-scale maps.
One factor you do not mention which I think is as significant as any other is the human aspect - the *personality* of the corps/division commanders. Many times history demonstrates to us that inter-personal friction between senior commanders could ruin the plans of an army commander. Your four questions do not cover this issue and I think its one of the really key ones for 1815. Wellington was on good terms with all his senior commanders and very importantly Blucher and Wellington co-operated well. Gneisenau and the Prussian staff were also able to keep the Prussian army functioning for the crucial 24 hours after Ligny when Blucher was not able to command.
On the French side there were several corps commanders who did not get on with each other and both Ney and Grouchy, while excellent corps commanders were out of their depth as wing commanders. There were significant personality frictions in the French high command.
You often find that in wargames it is easy for Napoleon to defeat Wellington at Waterloo and for the French to defeat the Allies in a wargame campaign. Few wargames and wargame campaigns attempt to address the issue of the human aspect of command friction.
1) How far could a 20k corps march on a paved road per hour?
2) How long would it be before a second corps could start to use the same road?
3) Same two questions for a minor road net e.g. from Wavre to Plancenoit
4) Could either a cavalry or an infantry corps actually travel entirely off road assuming no river obstacle?
I have run numerous pen-and-paper and PBEM campaigns in my time and I have found that a rate of movement that seems to cover the historical *average* march distances of most armies of the horse-drawn era in Europe is between 10 and 15 miles a day. For short periods on good roads troops could move more rapidly though. A lot depended on the road net, terrain, weather and skill of the command team.
1) MPH move rates are impossible to state because so many factors can affect speed of march. You should think in terms of miles per day as a minimum. I'd say 10 to 15. I think Napoleon would assume his corps could cover 20 miles a day in exceptional circumstances over good roads but I personally feel this is optimistic and troops moving at such rates would quickly outpace their supporting traffic columns.
2) Wellington's march instructions of 1815 show columns of march with the heavy baggage of each corps ordered to move at the tail of *all* the corps, so the fighting elements of all the corps would go first. The troops would thus reach a days end destination and have more time to rest while the heavy baggage came up in the night. Rather than the way you phrase it, a better question is "how soon can a second corps arrive at the same destination as the first in a fit state to go into combat"? Throwing corps after corps piecemeal into a battle is no way to fight and hope to be able to control how a battle flows. Gettysburg is a good example of the kind of inconclusive or chaotic battle that can develop if corps are put into action as they arrive. Ideally an army commander would want to assemble all the corps he needed for a battle on the battlefield the evening before his intended fight. So I would answer your question by saying this is the wrong question to ask as its answer isn't useful no matter how long it takes. In order to let a commander retain the fullest control he needs to orchestrate a major battle he would want all his corps all ready to go into action at dawn of the day of battle. The leading troops of Bluchers Prussians actually reached Frichermont woods around 9:00am on the 18th June but his corps were not able to significantly put effort into the battle until 7 or 8 hours later; so a corps that arrives on the day of battle is rarely able to achieve its full potential.
3) Minor roads were avoided as much as possible. It took Bluchers troops I think 9 hours to cover the 4 miles from Wavre to Smohain where they began to affect Napoleon's decision making due to their proximity to Mont St Jean. I recommend Peter Hofschroer's books on the 1815 fighting on this aspect as he covers in detail the Prussian march rates and the terrain their men had to negotiate.
4) No. Major formations never travelled off roads as the chances of losing the way and of couriers being unable to find them to deliver instructions multiply. If a corps is strung out down a road the corps commander, his division commanders and the army commander all know where to send couriers - along that road. Once a corps goes across country the potential for delayed communication rises to a level that it becomes impractical to co-ordinate any kind of grand tactical moves. A corps going across country has no waypoints to aim for. Using a road network was the only way to achieve any kind of certainty as to where you were in the days before clear accurate large-scale maps.
One factor you do not mention which I think is as significant as any other is the human aspect - the *personality* of the corps/division commanders. Many times history demonstrates to us that inter-personal friction between senior commanders could ruin the plans of an army commander. Your four questions do not cover this issue and I think its one of the really key ones for 1815. Wellington was on good terms with all his senior commanders and very importantly Blucher and Wellington co-operated well. Gneisenau and the Prussian staff were also able to keep the Prussian army functioning for the crucial 24 hours after Ligny when Blucher was not able to command.
On the French side there were several corps commanders who did not get on with each other and both Ney and Grouchy, while excellent corps commanders were out of their depth as wing commanders. There were significant personality frictions in the French high command.
You often find that in wargames it is easy for Napoleon to defeat Wellington at Waterloo and for the French to defeat the Allies in a wargame campaign. Few wargames and wargame campaigns attempt to address the issue of the human aspect of command friction.
HITS & Couriers - a different and realistic way to play SoW MP.
Re: Asymmetric Campaign Battles
Hi Saddletank
Thank you for your answers.
I guess in an ideal world a commander would want all his corps assembled but that was not always possible. The march and counter-march of d'Erlon was one example and the failure to summon Lobau earlier was another.
Some analysts attribute Napoleon's late start at Waterloo to his troops not all being assembled and I have seen it suggested that the Guard's 12lb batteries were never engaged in the battle.
if two more large infantry corps had had to travel down the road from Quatre Bras, they could only have arrived during the 18th June which would impact they deployment.
One further question relating to an asymmetric campaign is just how much better might Napoleon have done at Ligny? Clearly Bulow's corps would still have been available to the Allies and Thielman's corps was also less heavily engaged and being positioned to the east might have been harder for the French to damage more seriously.
Regards
Mike
Thank you for your answers.
I guess in an ideal world a commander would want all his corps assembled but that was not always possible. The march and counter-march of d'Erlon was one example and the failure to summon Lobau earlier was another.
Some analysts attribute Napoleon's late start at Waterloo to his troops not all being assembled and I have seen it suggested that the Guard's 12lb batteries were never engaged in the battle.
if two more large infantry corps had had to travel down the road from Quatre Bras, they could only have arrived during the 18th June which would impact they deployment.
One further question relating to an asymmetric campaign is just how much better might Napoleon have done at Ligny? Clearly Bulow's corps would still have been available to the Allies and Thielman's corps was also less heavily engaged and being positioned to the east might have been harder for the French to damage more seriously.
Regards
Mike
Re: Asymmetric Campaign Battles
Hi Saddletank
I am interested to know how you handle further use of casualties and those routing in your KS mod campaigns.
I have read that something like 10% of the wounded died after they reach medical facilities at or near the battle site. In addition there were those like Picton who was wounded at Quatre Bras but was available to fight again at Waterloo. I do not actually know how historical battle reports distinguish these two situations. Are those reported dead in the game just bodies left on the battlefield or would they normally include deaths whilst under medical care soon after? Similarly would reports of wounded include relatively minor injuries?
Might a broad brush approach divide total casualties as 45 - 50% dead or incapacitated for the duration of the campaign and 50- 55% available to fight again possibly with some delay and varied by who retained control of the battlefield?
The future of those routed or missing would depend on ownership of the battlefield but also might be influenced by the direction of any retreat. For example at Ligny the Prussians permanently lost about 10k who headed off East towards Liege and home whilst their main force withdrew North to Wavre. If Wellington had retreated after Waterloo his routed British units might have previously headed for Hal and Ostend whilst his routed Dutch & Belgian units might have headed for Brussels thus he might incur greater routed losses depending on his eventual choice for the army as a whole.
Regards
Mike
I am interested to know how you handle further use of casualties and those routing in your KS mod campaigns.
I have read that something like 10% of the wounded died after they reach medical facilities at or near the battle site. In addition there were those like Picton who was wounded at Quatre Bras but was available to fight again at Waterloo. I do not actually know how historical battle reports distinguish these two situations. Are those reported dead in the game just bodies left on the battlefield or would they normally include deaths whilst under medical care soon after? Similarly would reports of wounded include relatively minor injuries?
Might a broad brush approach divide total casualties as 45 - 50% dead or incapacitated for the duration of the campaign and 50- 55% available to fight again possibly with some delay and varied by who retained control of the battlefield?
The future of those routed or missing would depend on ownership of the battlefield but also might be influenced by the direction of any retreat. For example at Ligny the Prussians permanently lost about 10k who headed off East towards Liege and home whilst their main force withdrew North to Wavre. If Wellington had retreated after Waterloo his routed British units might have previously headed for Hal and Ostend whilst his routed Dutch & Belgian units might have headed for Brussels thus he might incur greater routed losses depending on his eventual choice for the army as a whole.
Regards
Mike
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Saddletank
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Re: Asymmetric Campaign Battles
I use a small piece of stand-alone software written by a member of this forum that calculates casualties, wounded, returnees with light wounds and deserters/missing who return to the colours. It has variable setiings to alter the percentage range of wounded, routers and missing who return and of course the winner of a battle will always get more wounded, routers and missing back through control of the battlefield.
A game umpire can adjust the results manually as well if there is a special case (such as you describe after Ligny or a hypothetical Anglo-Dutch defeat at Waterloo).
I can send you a link to it if you are interested.
A game umpire can adjust the results manually as well if there is a special case (such as you describe after Ligny or a hypothetical Anglo-Dutch defeat at Waterloo).
I can send you a link to it if you are interested.
HITS & Couriers - a different and realistic way to play SoW MP.
Re: Asymmetric Campaign Battles
Yes please - do you want my email or will you post it online?
Regards
Mike
Regards
Mike
Re: Asymmetric Campaign Battles UPDATE
Just to give you an update on my campaign development, I now have a single OOB that I can use for both QB and Ligny and which should carry forward to Waterloo and potentially a battle near Wavre. This was a non-trivial task as I needed facilities for some units (e.g. D’Erlon’s) to participate in either Ligny or QB. I also found that the OOB sequences for some Prussian units differ between those issued for Waterloo and Ligny and some units such as Subervie’s division appear in different parts of the OOB in different battles. Finally there were a number of minor errors in the OOBs such as a space being used instead of a zero in the unit ID columns. The normal game gets round this by inserting a zero where it finds a space which is often but not always appropriate, however, spaces cause the OOB carry forward tool I have had from another player to crash so I had to find and correct these.
I am currently testing both my QB and Ligny variants to fine tune objective values and to evaluate how to handle casualties, captives and the Prussian desertions after Ligny. I should note that I have an objective location where the roads to Wavre and Brussels meet behind the Prussian position for Ligny and this generates a lot of VPs and pretty well determines the victory level if captured soon enough. The battle at QB will usually end as it did historically as a draw.
My latest attempt at Ligny had the following results – the Prussian starting force was 88,850 and they suffered 14,048 losses and a decisive defeat. To obtain this loss figure the recovery tool had given them a return rate of between 10 and 25% for routed wounded and between 25% and 50% for normal wounded. The French had the same return rate values but with a 25% increase in returns for a decisive victory giving them 11,481 losses as they were decisive victors and effectively held the field. These numbers are actually surprisingly close to history but I still have to think about captured units.
The bare facts for captures are that the Prussians lost 29 guns to capture and the French 18. The Prussians lost a further 45 infantry or cavalry units (out of a total of 220 units) and the French 16 out of 240. The OOB carry over tool has a facility for recruitment between battles but it is possible to set that to a negative value so I could use that to increase the Prussian losses by 20% to take account of captured units – I would not apply captured losses to the French in view of their decisive victory. This can result in some significantly underpowered units so I will need to think about the implication of that for the next battles in the sequence.
With respect to the historic Prussian deserters I am considering the following. If the French gain a decisive victory and they have sufficient fresh cavalry units then I could give them an option to harry the Prussians. My definition of fresh is that a cavalry division must have suffered less than 1% casualties. In my last Ligny battle 6 x French cavalry divisions would qualify – Maurin, Stolz, Soult, Subervie, Walthier and Delort. Each such division would increase the Prussian casualties by a further 10%. Thus if all 6 participated then that would generate a rough equivalent to the 10k desertions the Prussians actually suffered. This will cause the player to have to consider keeping some cavalry units fresh for the pursuit. Napoleon is often criticised by modern historians for “forgetting” Lobau’s VI Corps but another interpretation would be that he wanted to keep some troops fresh for further battles.
This might appear a neat solution but I think I would have to set a rule that these harrying units would have to follow the Prussians to the Dyle and not therefore be available for Waterloo so not a straightforward decision.
Since my campaign is not meant to be historic my thinking at the moment is that the French commander should have some flexibility as to which forces he effectively gives to Grouchy to chase/harry the Prussians. Both the Prussians and Wellington thought that Napoleon would have assigned about 15k men to the pursuit and their actions assumed this. Thus I will specify that the French player must assign at least 6 pursuing divisions, including 3 or more cavalry divisions, otherwise all the remaining Prussian units can appear at Waterloo between 1pm and 4pm. If the French player does assign at least 6 divisions then the Prussians must leave the Prussian III Corps to guard the Dyle and not participate in Waterloo. The French player can choose to assign more divisions and also choose whether to attack the Prussians on the Dyle starting at 9am. If the French have forced a crossing of the Dyle by 11am then the Prussian II corps must join the fight and will not therefore reach Waterloo otherwise they will reach Waterloo at between 6pm and 7pm. If the French achieve a further level of victory against the combined II and III Corps by 1pm then the Prussian I Corps must also join the fight otherwise they reach Waterloo at between 5pm and 6pm. Thereafter the situations at 2pm, 3pm and 4pm by the Dyle will determine whether a force of Prussians equivalent to I Corps’ strength after Ligny can reach Waterloo at 7pm, 8pm, 9pm or not at all. The “Grouchy” unit cannot prevent Prussian IV Corps reaching Waterloo between 4pm and 5pm.
In choosing which divisions to assign to the pursuit the French player would have to balance the advantage of fresh versus depleted cavalry units and stronger or weaker infantry divisions based on whether they expect to fight on the Dyle or not. Interestingly Napoleon did send several fresh cavalry units but mainly depleted infantry divisions.
I would be interested to hear any comments on my outline plans. My general expectation is that I will make more than one variant of Waterloo to cater for different units being present but usually units will be present but in a “reserve” position and the player should be aware from previous outcomes which can or cannot be used. My plan is that such “reserve” units, which have not been moved for 30 minutes, will become locked and hidden so as not to clutter the battlefield.
Finally I do hope to be able to publish some of the scenarios that are part of the campaign. However, I will not provide it as an integrated whole partly because the OOB carry over tool is not mine to publish and partly because it is quite complicated to massage the casualty/dump files to make them useable by the tool and then plug the OOB data back into the relevant scenario file.
Regards
Mike
I am currently testing both my QB and Ligny variants to fine tune objective values and to evaluate how to handle casualties, captives and the Prussian desertions after Ligny. I should note that I have an objective location where the roads to Wavre and Brussels meet behind the Prussian position for Ligny and this generates a lot of VPs and pretty well determines the victory level if captured soon enough. The battle at QB will usually end as it did historically as a draw.
My latest attempt at Ligny had the following results – the Prussian starting force was 88,850 and they suffered 14,048 losses and a decisive defeat. To obtain this loss figure the recovery tool had given them a return rate of between 10 and 25% for routed wounded and between 25% and 50% for normal wounded. The French had the same return rate values but with a 25% increase in returns for a decisive victory giving them 11,481 losses as they were decisive victors and effectively held the field. These numbers are actually surprisingly close to history but I still have to think about captured units.
The bare facts for captures are that the Prussians lost 29 guns to capture and the French 18. The Prussians lost a further 45 infantry or cavalry units (out of a total of 220 units) and the French 16 out of 240. The OOB carry over tool has a facility for recruitment between battles but it is possible to set that to a negative value so I could use that to increase the Prussian losses by 20% to take account of captured units – I would not apply captured losses to the French in view of their decisive victory. This can result in some significantly underpowered units so I will need to think about the implication of that for the next battles in the sequence.
With respect to the historic Prussian deserters I am considering the following. If the French gain a decisive victory and they have sufficient fresh cavalry units then I could give them an option to harry the Prussians. My definition of fresh is that a cavalry division must have suffered less than 1% casualties. In my last Ligny battle 6 x French cavalry divisions would qualify – Maurin, Stolz, Soult, Subervie, Walthier and Delort. Each such division would increase the Prussian casualties by a further 10%. Thus if all 6 participated then that would generate a rough equivalent to the 10k desertions the Prussians actually suffered. This will cause the player to have to consider keeping some cavalry units fresh for the pursuit. Napoleon is often criticised by modern historians for “forgetting” Lobau’s VI Corps but another interpretation would be that he wanted to keep some troops fresh for further battles.
This might appear a neat solution but I think I would have to set a rule that these harrying units would have to follow the Prussians to the Dyle and not therefore be available for Waterloo so not a straightforward decision.
Since my campaign is not meant to be historic my thinking at the moment is that the French commander should have some flexibility as to which forces he effectively gives to Grouchy to chase/harry the Prussians. Both the Prussians and Wellington thought that Napoleon would have assigned about 15k men to the pursuit and their actions assumed this. Thus I will specify that the French player must assign at least 6 pursuing divisions, including 3 or more cavalry divisions, otherwise all the remaining Prussian units can appear at Waterloo between 1pm and 4pm. If the French player does assign at least 6 divisions then the Prussians must leave the Prussian III Corps to guard the Dyle and not participate in Waterloo. The French player can choose to assign more divisions and also choose whether to attack the Prussians on the Dyle starting at 9am. If the French have forced a crossing of the Dyle by 11am then the Prussian II corps must join the fight and will not therefore reach Waterloo otherwise they will reach Waterloo at between 6pm and 7pm. If the French achieve a further level of victory against the combined II and III Corps by 1pm then the Prussian I Corps must also join the fight otherwise they reach Waterloo at between 5pm and 6pm. Thereafter the situations at 2pm, 3pm and 4pm by the Dyle will determine whether a force of Prussians equivalent to I Corps’ strength after Ligny can reach Waterloo at 7pm, 8pm, 9pm or not at all. The “Grouchy” unit cannot prevent Prussian IV Corps reaching Waterloo between 4pm and 5pm.
In choosing which divisions to assign to the pursuit the French player would have to balance the advantage of fresh versus depleted cavalry units and stronger or weaker infantry divisions based on whether they expect to fight on the Dyle or not. Interestingly Napoleon did send several fresh cavalry units but mainly depleted infantry divisions.
I would be interested to hear any comments on my outline plans. My general expectation is that I will make more than one variant of Waterloo to cater for different units being present but usually units will be present but in a “reserve” position and the player should be aware from previous outcomes which can or cannot be used. My plan is that such “reserve” units, which have not been moved for 30 minutes, will become locked and hidden so as not to clutter the battlefield.
Finally I do hope to be able to publish some of the scenarios that are part of the campaign. However, I will not provide it as an integrated whole partly because the OOB carry over tool is not mine to publish and partly because it is quite complicated to massage the casualty/dump files to make them useable by the tool and then plug the OOB data back into the relevant scenario file.
Regards
Mike
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Saddletank
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Re: Asymmetric Campaign Battles UPDATE
This is all sounding really promising. Keep at it!
HITS & Couriers - a different and realistic way to play SoW MP.
Re: Asymmetric Campaign Battles UPDATE
I have found some more information that relates to the issue of those recorded as captured in the battle dump. I had previously been under the impression that the fighting at Ligny was so harsh that few if any prisoners were taken. However, I have been reading a report of the Prussian losses written by them in 1815 that includes the fact that many Prussian prisoners taken earlier in the campaign were freed as a result of the French fleeing from Waterloo and this distorts the figures for the actual losses suffered after Ligny. It is possible therefore that the effective Prussian losses at Ligny were understated in the historic records.
I am thinking therefore that I might apply the full loss to the Prussians of the units recorded in the game as captured. In my last trial this would increase the Prussian losses by 7,974. It will also mean that I would have to go through the relevant OOB and Scenario files removing these units from subsequent battles.
Regards
Mike
I am thinking therefore that I might apply the full loss to the Prussians of the units recorded in the game as captured. In my last trial this would increase the Prussian losses by 7,974. It will also mean that I would have to go through the relevant OOB and Scenario files removing these units from subsequent battles.
Regards
Mike
Last edited by mcaryf on Sun Jan 08, 2017 4:05 am, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Asymmetric Campaign Battles
A further update on my thoughts and development for a Waterloo campaign.
Historically Quatre Bras was both a tactical and strategic draw. The Allies did suffer slightly more casualties but by the end of the day were pushing the French back to their starting positions around Frasnes. Strategically the French achieved their main objective of preventing Wellington from directly supporting Blucher but Wellington’s actions (plus French errors) thwarted Napoleon’s plan to have Ney’s forces play a significant role at Ligny.
My variants of QB and Ligny do allow elements of D’Erlon’s corps to participate potentially decisively in both battles. Quiot’s Division and the Corps artillery will always be available from about 4.00pm (with some variation) for use at QB. Initially the rest of the Corps will also appear on the QB map but will then disappear off the West edge. Durutte’s Division and Jacquinot’s Cavalry will appear variably around 4.30pm on the NE edge of the Ligny map and will be available for use in the battle. Marcognet de Bigny and Donzelot’s Divisions will appear a short time after. also on the NE edge, however, if they are not deployed away from their arrival location within 15 minutes they will disappear again as having effectively been recalled or sent back to QB. At QB at some time after 5pm the French player will have the option to send D’Erlon himself to an objective point on the West edge to recall either or both of the two Divisions which will appear after a few minutes.
Historically the outcome at Ligny would have determined whether Napoleon’s campaign could continue. If the Prussians had held at Ligny, they would have been reinforced by both Wellington and Bulow during the next day. The same was not the case at QB. Even if Ney had driven the Allies back from the crossroads they would have been falling back towards reinforcements so could not have been encircled as might have happened at Ligny. Thus a French campaigner who fails to win at Ligny should immediately lose. When the French forced the Prussians back from Ligny the Allies had to withdraw from QB regardless of how well they had or had not done versus Ney.
I do, however, think the outcome of QB should be relevant other than just applying the losses to both sides OOB’s. I will have 4 major objective locations in the scenario that will yield most VP’s towards the end of the day. These will be the QB Crossroads, Grand Pierrepont, Gemioncourt and Thyle on the road leading to Ligny. If the French end up holding all 4 then they will certainly have gained a decisive victory and the Allies will suffer lower recovery of wounded and captured units will lose up to 75% of their strength. I have decided by the way that it is too complicated to try to adapt future battle scripts or scenario files to cope with units being entirely absent hence losses of up to 75% will be the maximum I apply. If on the other hand the Allies end up owning all 4 (as they did historically) then they will gain a decisive victory but this will have a different impact. In a previous post I suggested that the French might get an option to harry the Prussians and cause additional losses if they gained a decisive victory at Ligny. The main effect of a decisive French defeat at QB will be that this French Ligny option will be either withdrawn or more limited. The theory being that Napoleon would have to send some of his fresh cavalry and other units to prevent disaster befalling Ney rather than pursuing the Prussians. This lack of immediate pursuit would actually match what happened although not really for the same reasons. In the case of a Decisive Allied victory at QB, the French would only suffer 50% loss for captured units on the basis that the Allies would have to retreat from QB the next day anyway so more prisoners might get away.
Minor victory or defeat at QB will just have an impact on casualty levels and captured units will suffer 25% additional losses. In the most probable case of a draw, captured units would suffer no additional loss.
I have done some further research to help me decide how to handle the Prussian losses to desertion after Ligny and what factors to use for additional “harrying losses”. In particular I have looked at what happened on June 15th during the French invasion. The Prussian losses were around 1200 and the French 3-400. Most of the Prussian losses were to two battalions - the Fusilier Battalion of the 28th Infantry Rgt and the 3rd Btn of the 2. Westfälisches Landwehr Rgt. According to Hofschroer the remnants of these two battalions were amalgamated before Ligny. That change does not appear in the standard game scenario OOBs. I have decided not to implement the amalgamation either but I have reduced the strength of each to just 350 men. This is a loss of nearly 800 men as compared with the 1200 actual but I decided to net off the French and Prussian losses and thus not apply any to the French which included quite a few cavalry losses.
It was in fact French cavalry that caused most of the Prussian losses and 3 Divisions in particular those of Pire and Domon plus one from the Imperial Guard. These 3 Divisions caused about 3-4% losses to Ziethen whose Corps started out with about 25k men. I have decided therefore to make my additional harrying loss per pursuing fresh French cavalry division 1% of the total surviving Prussian strength applied across all their units. I have also decided to apply the Prussian losses to desertion separately because my research indicates that it was Thielmannn’s III Corps that suffered the greatest loss (about 5K) although they had the fewest casualties. Thus a French decisive victory at Ligny will result in an additional 20% loss to III Corps and 10% to each of the other two Corps and half these percentages for a minor victory. I am intending to create an EXCEL spreadsheet to allow percentage decreases to be applied at a divisional level to subsequent battle scenario or OOB files.
I am still fine tuning the scenarios mainly by making the Prussians less prone to rash offensive actions than they historically were (and are in the standard game) and by making them defend the area of my two new French objectives – the Road to Bruxelles and the Road to Namur. The first of these objectives becomes vulnerable to the French arrivals on that flank which are The Guard Light Cavalry between 3pm and 4pm and D’Erlon’s units between 4pm and 5pm.
As before I would welcome any comments on my approach.
Regards
Mike
Historically Quatre Bras was both a tactical and strategic draw. The Allies did suffer slightly more casualties but by the end of the day were pushing the French back to their starting positions around Frasnes. Strategically the French achieved their main objective of preventing Wellington from directly supporting Blucher but Wellington’s actions (plus French errors) thwarted Napoleon’s plan to have Ney’s forces play a significant role at Ligny.
My variants of QB and Ligny do allow elements of D’Erlon’s corps to participate potentially decisively in both battles. Quiot’s Division and the Corps artillery will always be available from about 4.00pm (with some variation) for use at QB. Initially the rest of the Corps will also appear on the QB map but will then disappear off the West edge. Durutte’s Division and Jacquinot’s Cavalry will appear variably around 4.30pm on the NE edge of the Ligny map and will be available for use in the battle. Marcognet de Bigny and Donzelot’s Divisions will appear a short time after. also on the NE edge, however, if they are not deployed away from their arrival location within 15 minutes they will disappear again as having effectively been recalled or sent back to QB. At QB at some time after 5pm the French player will have the option to send D’Erlon himself to an objective point on the West edge to recall either or both of the two Divisions which will appear after a few minutes.
Historically the outcome at Ligny would have determined whether Napoleon’s campaign could continue. If the Prussians had held at Ligny, they would have been reinforced by both Wellington and Bulow during the next day. The same was not the case at QB. Even if Ney had driven the Allies back from the crossroads they would have been falling back towards reinforcements so could not have been encircled as might have happened at Ligny. Thus a French campaigner who fails to win at Ligny should immediately lose. When the French forced the Prussians back from Ligny the Allies had to withdraw from QB regardless of how well they had or had not done versus Ney.
I do, however, think the outcome of QB should be relevant other than just applying the losses to both sides OOB’s. I will have 4 major objective locations in the scenario that will yield most VP’s towards the end of the day. These will be the QB Crossroads, Grand Pierrepont, Gemioncourt and Thyle on the road leading to Ligny. If the French end up holding all 4 then they will certainly have gained a decisive victory and the Allies will suffer lower recovery of wounded and captured units will lose up to 75% of their strength. I have decided by the way that it is too complicated to try to adapt future battle scripts or scenario files to cope with units being entirely absent hence losses of up to 75% will be the maximum I apply. If on the other hand the Allies end up owning all 4 (as they did historically) then they will gain a decisive victory but this will have a different impact. In a previous post I suggested that the French might get an option to harry the Prussians and cause additional losses if they gained a decisive victory at Ligny. The main effect of a decisive French defeat at QB will be that this French Ligny option will be either withdrawn or more limited. The theory being that Napoleon would have to send some of his fresh cavalry and other units to prevent disaster befalling Ney rather than pursuing the Prussians. This lack of immediate pursuit would actually match what happened although not really for the same reasons. In the case of a Decisive Allied victory at QB, the French would only suffer 50% loss for captured units on the basis that the Allies would have to retreat from QB the next day anyway so more prisoners might get away.
Minor victory or defeat at QB will just have an impact on casualty levels and captured units will suffer 25% additional losses. In the most probable case of a draw, captured units would suffer no additional loss.
I have done some further research to help me decide how to handle the Prussian losses to desertion after Ligny and what factors to use for additional “harrying losses”. In particular I have looked at what happened on June 15th during the French invasion. The Prussian losses were around 1200 and the French 3-400. Most of the Prussian losses were to two battalions - the Fusilier Battalion of the 28th Infantry Rgt and the 3rd Btn of the 2. Westfälisches Landwehr Rgt. According to Hofschroer the remnants of these two battalions were amalgamated before Ligny. That change does not appear in the standard game scenario OOBs. I have decided not to implement the amalgamation either but I have reduced the strength of each to just 350 men. This is a loss of nearly 800 men as compared with the 1200 actual but I decided to net off the French and Prussian losses and thus not apply any to the French which included quite a few cavalry losses.
It was in fact French cavalry that caused most of the Prussian losses and 3 Divisions in particular those of Pire and Domon plus one from the Imperial Guard. These 3 Divisions caused about 3-4% losses to Ziethen whose Corps started out with about 25k men. I have decided therefore to make my additional harrying loss per pursuing fresh French cavalry division 1% of the total surviving Prussian strength applied across all their units. I have also decided to apply the Prussian losses to desertion separately because my research indicates that it was Thielmannn’s III Corps that suffered the greatest loss (about 5K) although they had the fewest casualties. Thus a French decisive victory at Ligny will result in an additional 20% loss to III Corps and 10% to each of the other two Corps and half these percentages for a minor victory. I am intending to create an EXCEL spreadsheet to allow percentage decreases to be applied at a divisional level to subsequent battle scenario or OOB files.
I am still fine tuning the scenarios mainly by making the Prussians less prone to rash offensive actions than they historically were (and are in the standard game) and by making them defend the area of my two new French objectives – the Road to Bruxelles and the Road to Namur. The first of these objectives becomes vulnerable to the French arrivals on that flank which are The Guard Light Cavalry between 3pm and 4pm and D’Erlon’s units between 4pm and 5pm.
As before I would welcome any comments on my approach.
Regards
Mike