Could you explain why you believe that Paddy Griffith's research and findings are wrong? He wrote his Oxford thesis on this topic, as well as his 2007 book. This is his life's work, which you say is wrong. Can you explain how you have reached your conclusion? Can you explain why you believe your opinion to be more accurate than his work? Thanks.
His credentials are detailed in the wiki article. He was educated at Oxford and worked for Sandhurst and the UK Ministry of Defense.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paddy_Griffith
How to use ATTACK Columns ?
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Jean Lafitte
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Re: How to use ATTACK Columns ?
Last edited by Jean Lafitte on Fri Jun 19, 2015 6:42 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Re: How to use ATTACK Columns ?
Just below the table it state: "This sample includes 15 attacks in echelon; 148 (65%) on rough or narrow ground; and 58 (28%) against British troops."
Note that 2/3 of the Col d'Att actions were on ground where staying in a line formation was either a bad idea or not possible. Much more informative would be knowing which of these attacks succeeded and against which army. That would be much more useful information that could help adjust the tuning of the AI.
-Jim
Note that 2/3 of the Col d'Att actions were on ground where staying in a line formation was either a bad idea or not possible. Much more informative would be knowing which of these attacks succeeded and against which army. That would be much more useful information that could help adjust the tuning of the AI.
-Jim
"My God, if we've not got a cool brain and a big one too, to manage this affair, the nation is ruined forever." Unknown private, 14th Vermont, 2 July 1863
Re: How to use ATTACK Columns ?
The statistics from Griffith I think are accurates, but they indicates how the attacks are conduct not finalized.
Like he states in the text, some of attacks in columns are aimed to deploy in line before engage the enemy, some not. He concludes that ground, officer attitude, perception of how good it is the enemy (if it can be broken by the simple bayonet assault or not) were all factors which determines this decision.
If you read Thiebault description of his brigade attack at AUsterlitz you can see regiments switch from column to line and back on the base of decisions of what is better to use and flexibility in the battalion use:
1 Colonel Mazas 1st/14th regiment attack Pratzen village with a single battalion in line with a reserve of 3 battalions in a column of lines. A ravine slow down the movement and the unexpected russian fire broke the battalion which fled. Thiebault comments that Mazas should have sent scouts to explore the ground and the village his fault was to have advanced without them.
2 in the meantime the 1st battalion start to rally, the 36th regiment is ordered to the reach the 14th in the Pratzen attack. the 2nd battalion attack at bayonet the village like it is deployed (in line because it was part of reserve) running over the ravine and inside the village with Thiebault with his men. The village was cleared.
3 Cleared the village, the brigade restart to march in order to reach Morand Brigade. The 10th light of this brigade is facing the full Kamensky brigade which is outflanking him left and right. Saint Hilaire asked one battalion of Thiebault and he sent the first of 14th (rallied now evidently) which deploy right of 10th.
4 The rest of Thiebault brigade is reaching Morand in order to fight back Kamensky when they see on the left of Thiebault and rear of Morand unknown troops advancing. Both THiebault and Santin Hilaire cannot determine if they are allied; the unknow newcomers scream to be Bavarians but Thiebault stopped the nearest three battalions near him and deploy at all speed the 36th to face them linking to Morand line as pivot , holding the 2nd battalion fo 14th in column on the left of line as reserve and deploying the guns on the wings of 36th. BOth Thiebault and Morand goes in exploration untile they are in the middle between the opposing lines, they decided they are enemies and go back.
5 Thiebault orderd to load guns with solid shot and grapes and leave the enemy to advance until 30-40 yards and at this distance guns and musket start to fire at the same moment against the newcomers. After have driven away this austrian attempt, Thiebault join Morand in fight back Kamensky brigade and hold the heights anr repel all the russo-austrian attacks.
Like he states in the text, some of attacks in columns are aimed to deploy in line before engage the enemy, some not. He concludes that ground, officer attitude, perception of how good it is the enemy (if it can be broken by the simple bayonet assault or not) were all factors which determines this decision.
If you read Thiebault description of his brigade attack at AUsterlitz you can see regiments switch from column to line and back on the base of decisions of what is better to use and flexibility in the battalion use:
1 Colonel Mazas 1st/14th regiment attack Pratzen village with a single battalion in line with a reserve of 3 battalions in a column of lines. A ravine slow down the movement and the unexpected russian fire broke the battalion which fled. Thiebault comments that Mazas should have sent scouts to explore the ground and the village his fault was to have advanced without them.
2 in the meantime the 1st battalion start to rally, the 36th regiment is ordered to the reach the 14th in the Pratzen attack. the 2nd battalion attack at bayonet the village like it is deployed (in line because it was part of reserve) running over the ravine and inside the village with Thiebault with his men. The village was cleared.
3 Cleared the village, the brigade restart to march in order to reach Morand Brigade. The 10th light of this brigade is facing the full Kamensky brigade which is outflanking him left and right. Saint Hilaire asked one battalion of Thiebault and he sent the first of 14th (rallied now evidently) which deploy right of 10th.
4 The rest of Thiebault brigade is reaching Morand in order to fight back Kamensky when they see on the left of Thiebault and rear of Morand unknown troops advancing. Both THiebault and Santin Hilaire cannot determine if they are allied; the unknow newcomers scream to be Bavarians but Thiebault stopped the nearest three battalions near him and deploy at all speed the 36th to face them linking to Morand line as pivot , holding the 2nd battalion fo 14th in column on the left of line as reserve and deploying the guns on the wings of 36th. BOth Thiebault and Morand goes in exploration untile they are in the middle between the opposing lines, they decided they are enemies and go back.
5 Thiebault orderd to load guns with solid shot and grapes and leave the enemy to advance until 30-40 yards and at this distance guns and musket start to fire at the same moment against the newcomers. After have driven away this austrian attempt, Thiebault join Morand in fight back Kamensky brigade and hold the heights anr repel all the russo-austrian attacks.
Visit my wargames blog: http://warforgame.blogspot.it/
Re: How to use ATTACK Columns ?
Again on the argument I report what Du Picq tell about this:
"
The shock is a mere term. The de Saxe, the Bugeaud theory: "Close with the bayonet and with fire action at close quarters. That is what kills people and the victor is the one who kills most," is not founded on fact. No enemy awaits you if you are determined, and never, never, never, are two equal determinations opposed to each other. It is well known to everybody, to all nations, that the French have never met any one who resisted a bayonet charge.
The English in Spain, marching resolutely in face of the charges of the French in column, have always defeated them.... The English were not dismayed at the mass. If Napoleon had recalled the defeat of the giants of the Armada by the English vessels, he might not have ordered the use of the d'Erlon column.
Blücher in his instructions to his troops, recalled that the French have never held out before the resolute march of the Prussians in attack column....
Suvaroff used no better tactics. Yet his battalions in Italy drove us at the point of their bayonets.
Each nation in Europe says: "No one stands his ground before a bayonet charge made by us." All are right. The French, no more than others, resist a resolute attack. All are persuaded that their attacks are irresistable; that an advance will frighten the enemy into flight. Whether the bayonet be fixed or in the scabbard makes no difference....
There is an old saying that young troops become uneasy if any one comes upon them in a tumult and in disorder; the old troops, on the contrary, see victory therein. At the commencement of a war, all troops are young. Our impetuosity pushes us to the front like fools ... the enemy flees. If the war lasts, everybody becomes inured. The enemy no longer troubles himself when in front of troops charging in a disordered way, because he knows and feels that they are moved as much by fear as by determination. Good order alone impresses the enemy in an attack, for it indicates real determination. That is why it is necessary to secure good order and retain it to the very last. It is unwise to take the running step prematurely, because you become a flock of sheep and leave so many men behind that you will not reach your objective. The close column is absurd; it turns you in advance into a flock of sheep, where officers and men are jumbled together without mutual support. It is then necessary to march as far as possible in such order as best permits the action of the non-commissioned officers, the action of unity, every one marching in front of eye-witnesses, in the open. On the other hand, in closed columns man marches unobserved and on the slightest pretext he lies down or remains behind. Therefore, it is best always to keep the skirmishers in advance or on the flanks, and never to recall them when in proximity to the enemy. To do so establishes a counter current that carries away your men. Let your skirmishers alone. They are your lost children; they will know best how to take care of themselves.
To sum up: there is no shock of infantry on infantry. There is no physical impulse, no force of mass. There is but a moral impulse. No one denies that this moral impulse is stronger as one feels better supported, that it has greater effect on the enemy as it menaces him with more men. From this it follows that the column is more valuable for the attack than the deployed order.
"
"
This done, they fled. He who calm and strong of heart awaits his enemy, has all the advantage of fire. But the moral impulse of the assailant demoralizes the assailed. He is frightened; he sets his sight no longer; he does not even aim his piece. His lines are broken without defense, unless indeed his cavalry, waiting halted, horsemen a meter apart and in two ranks, does not break first and destroy all formation.
With good troops on both sides, if an attack is not prepared, there is every reason to believe that it will fail. The attacking troops suffer more, materially, than the defenders. The latter are in better order, fresh, while the assailants are in disorder and already have suffered a loss of morale under a certain amount of punishment. The moral superiority given by the offensive movement may be more than compensated by the good order and integrity of the defenders, when the assailants have suffered losses. The slightest reaction by the defense may demoralize the attack. This is the secret of the success of the British infantry in Spain, and not their fire by rank, which was as ineffective with them as with us.
The more confidence one has in his methods of attack or defense, the more disconcerted he is to see them at some time incapable of stopping the enemy. The effect of the present improved fire arm is still limited, with the present organization and use of riflemen, to point blank ranges. It follows that bayonet charges (where bayonet thrusts never occur), otherwise attacks under fire, will have an increasing value, and that victory will be his who secures most order and determined dash. With these two qualities, too much neglected with us, with willingness, with intelligence enough to keep a firm hold on troops in immediate support, we may hope to take and to hold what we take. Do not then neglect destructive effort before using moral effect. Use skirmishers up to the last moment. Otherwise no attack can succeed. It is true it is haphazard fire, nevertheless it is effective because of its volume.
This moral effect must be a terrible thing. A body advances to meet another. The defender has only to remain calm, ready to aim, each man pitted against a man before him. The attacking body comes within deadly range. Whether or not it halts to fire, it will be a target for the other body which awaits it, calm, ready, sure of its effect. The whole first rank of the assailant falls, smashed. The remainder, little encouraged by their reception, disperse automatically or before the least indication of an advance on them. Is this what happens? Not at all! The moral effect of the assault worries the defenders. They fire in the air if at all. They disperse immediately before the assailants who are even encouraged by this fire now that it is over. It quickens them in order to avoid a second salvo.
It is said by those who fought them in Spain and at Waterloo that the British are capable of the necessary coolness. I doubt it nevertheless. After firing, they made swift attacks. If they had not, they might have fled. Anyhow the English are stolid folks, with little imagination, who try to be logical in all things. The French with their nervous irritability, their lively imagination, are incapable of such a defense.
Anybody who thinks that he could stand under a second fire is a man without any idea of battle. (Prince de Ligne).
Modern history furnishes us with no examples of stonewall troops who can neither be shaken nor driven back, who stand patiently the heaviest fire, yet who retire precipitately when the general orders the retreat. (Bismarck).
Cavalry maneuvers, like those of infantry, are threats. The most threatening win. The formation in ranks is a threat, and more than a threat. A force engaged is out of the hand of its commander. I know, I see what it does, what it is capable of. It acts; I can estimate the effect of its action. But a force in formation is in hand; I know it is there, I see it, feel it. It may be used in any direction. I feel instinctively that it alone can surely reach me, take me on the right, on the left, throw itself into a gap, turn me. It troubles me, threatens me. Where is the threatened blow going to fall?
The formation in ranks is a serious threat, which may at any moment be put into effect. It awes one in a terrible fashion. In the heat of battle, formed troops do more to secure victory than do those actively engaged. This is true, whether such a body actually exists or whether it exists only in the imagination of the enemy. In an indecisive battle, he wins who can show, and merely show, battalions and squadrons in hand. They inspire the fear of the unknown.
From the taking of the entrenchments at Fribourg up to the engagement at the bridge of Arcola, up to Solferino, there occur a multitude of deeds of valor, of positions taken by frontal attack, which deceive every one, generals as well as civilians, and which always cause the same mistakes to be made. It is time to teach these folks that the entrenchments at Fribourg were not won by frontal attack, nor was the bridge of Arcola (see the correspondence of Napoleon I), nor was Solferino.
Lieutenant Hercule took fifty cavalry through Alpon, ten kilometers on the flank of the Austrians at Arcola, and the position that held us up for three days, was evacuated. The evacuation was the result of strategic, if not of tactical, moral effect. General or soldier, man is the same.
Demonstrations should be made at greater or less distance, according to the morale of the enemy. That is to say, battle methods vary with the enemy, and an appropriate method should be employed in each individual case.
"
"
The shock is a mere term. The de Saxe, the Bugeaud theory: "Close with the bayonet and with fire action at close quarters. That is what kills people and the victor is the one who kills most," is not founded on fact. No enemy awaits you if you are determined, and never, never, never, are two equal determinations opposed to each other. It is well known to everybody, to all nations, that the French have never met any one who resisted a bayonet charge.
The English in Spain, marching resolutely in face of the charges of the French in column, have always defeated them.... The English were not dismayed at the mass. If Napoleon had recalled the defeat of the giants of the Armada by the English vessels, he might not have ordered the use of the d'Erlon column.
Blücher in his instructions to his troops, recalled that the French have never held out before the resolute march of the Prussians in attack column....
Suvaroff used no better tactics. Yet his battalions in Italy drove us at the point of their bayonets.
Each nation in Europe says: "No one stands his ground before a bayonet charge made by us." All are right. The French, no more than others, resist a resolute attack. All are persuaded that their attacks are irresistable; that an advance will frighten the enemy into flight. Whether the bayonet be fixed or in the scabbard makes no difference....
There is an old saying that young troops become uneasy if any one comes upon them in a tumult and in disorder; the old troops, on the contrary, see victory therein. At the commencement of a war, all troops are young. Our impetuosity pushes us to the front like fools ... the enemy flees. If the war lasts, everybody becomes inured. The enemy no longer troubles himself when in front of troops charging in a disordered way, because he knows and feels that they are moved as much by fear as by determination. Good order alone impresses the enemy in an attack, for it indicates real determination. That is why it is necessary to secure good order and retain it to the very last. It is unwise to take the running step prematurely, because you become a flock of sheep and leave so many men behind that you will not reach your objective. The close column is absurd; it turns you in advance into a flock of sheep, where officers and men are jumbled together without mutual support. It is then necessary to march as far as possible in such order as best permits the action of the non-commissioned officers, the action of unity, every one marching in front of eye-witnesses, in the open. On the other hand, in closed columns man marches unobserved and on the slightest pretext he lies down or remains behind. Therefore, it is best always to keep the skirmishers in advance or on the flanks, and never to recall them when in proximity to the enemy. To do so establishes a counter current that carries away your men. Let your skirmishers alone. They are your lost children; they will know best how to take care of themselves.
To sum up: there is no shock of infantry on infantry. There is no physical impulse, no force of mass. There is but a moral impulse. No one denies that this moral impulse is stronger as one feels better supported, that it has greater effect on the enemy as it menaces him with more men. From this it follows that the column is more valuable for the attack than the deployed order.
"
"
This done, they fled. He who calm and strong of heart awaits his enemy, has all the advantage of fire. But the moral impulse of the assailant demoralizes the assailed. He is frightened; he sets his sight no longer; he does not even aim his piece. His lines are broken without defense, unless indeed his cavalry, waiting halted, horsemen a meter apart and in two ranks, does not break first and destroy all formation.
With good troops on both sides, if an attack is not prepared, there is every reason to believe that it will fail. The attacking troops suffer more, materially, than the defenders. The latter are in better order, fresh, while the assailants are in disorder and already have suffered a loss of morale under a certain amount of punishment. The moral superiority given by the offensive movement may be more than compensated by the good order and integrity of the defenders, when the assailants have suffered losses. The slightest reaction by the defense may demoralize the attack. This is the secret of the success of the British infantry in Spain, and not their fire by rank, which was as ineffective with them as with us.
The more confidence one has in his methods of attack or defense, the more disconcerted he is to see them at some time incapable of stopping the enemy. The effect of the present improved fire arm is still limited, with the present organization and use of riflemen, to point blank ranges. It follows that bayonet charges (where bayonet thrusts never occur), otherwise attacks under fire, will have an increasing value, and that victory will be his who secures most order and determined dash. With these two qualities, too much neglected with us, with willingness, with intelligence enough to keep a firm hold on troops in immediate support, we may hope to take and to hold what we take. Do not then neglect destructive effort before using moral effect. Use skirmishers up to the last moment. Otherwise no attack can succeed. It is true it is haphazard fire, nevertheless it is effective because of its volume.
This moral effect must be a terrible thing. A body advances to meet another. The defender has only to remain calm, ready to aim, each man pitted against a man before him. The attacking body comes within deadly range. Whether or not it halts to fire, it will be a target for the other body which awaits it, calm, ready, sure of its effect. The whole first rank of the assailant falls, smashed. The remainder, little encouraged by their reception, disperse automatically or before the least indication of an advance on them. Is this what happens? Not at all! The moral effect of the assault worries the defenders. They fire in the air if at all. They disperse immediately before the assailants who are even encouraged by this fire now that it is over. It quickens them in order to avoid a second salvo.
It is said by those who fought them in Spain and at Waterloo that the British are capable of the necessary coolness. I doubt it nevertheless. After firing, they made swift attacks. If they had not, they might have fled. Anyhow the English are stolid folks, with little imagination, who try to be logical in all things. The French with their nervous irritability, their lively imagination, are incapable of such a defense.
Anybody who thinks that he could stand under a second fire is a man without any idea of battle. (Prince de Ligne).
Modern history furnishes us with no examples of stonewall troops who can neither be shaken nor driven back, who stand patiently the heaviest fire, yet who retire precipitately when the general orders the retreat. (Bismarck).
Cavalry maneuvers, like those of infantry, are threats. The most threatening win. The formation in ranks is a threat, and more than a threat. A force engaged is out of the hand of its commander. I know, I see what it does, what it is capable of. It acts; I can estimate the effect of its action. But a force in formation is in hand; I know it is there, I see it, feel it. It may be used in any direction. I feel instinctively that it alone can surely reach me, take me on the right, on the left, throw itself into a gap, turn me. It troubles me, threatens me. Where is the threatened blow going to fall?
The formation in ranks is a serious threat, which may at any moment be put into effect. It awes one in a terrible fashion. In the heat of battle, formed troops do more to secure victory than do those actively engaged. This is true, whether such a body actually exists or whether it exists only in the imagination of the enemy. In an indecisive battle, he wins who can show, and merely show, battalions and squadrons in hand. They inspire the fear of the unknown.
From the taking of the entrenchments at Fribourg up to the engagement at the bridge of Arcola, up to Solferino, there occur a multitude of deeds of valor, of positions taken by frontal attack, which deceive every one, generals as well as civilians, and which always cause the same mistakes to be made. It is time to teach these folks that the entrenchments at Fribourg were not won by frontal attack, nor was the bridge of Arcola (see the correspondence of Napoleon I), nor was Solferino.
Lieutenant Hercule took fifty cavalry through Alpon, ten kilometers on the flank of the Austrians at Arcola, and the position that held us up for three days, was evacuated. The evacuation was the result of strategic, if not of tactical, moral effect. General or soldier, man is the same.
Demonstrations should be made at greater or less distance, according to the morale of the enemy. That is to say, battle methods vary with the enemy, and an appropriate method should be employed in each individual case.
"
Visit my wargames blog: http://warforgame.blogspot.it/
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Jean Lafitte
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Re: How to use ATTACK Columns ?
Jim, how do you reach this conclusion? That's not the author's statement.
Note that 2/3 of the Col d'Att actions were on ground where staying in a line formation was either a bad idea or not possible.
-Jim
Seventy-eight percent of all French infantry bayonet attacks were executed in Attack Column formation. That is a significant majority. It's quite difficult to take note of Mr. Griffith's analysis and then reach the conclusion: "But most of the bayonet attacks would have been executed in Line formation, whenever Line was possible." That seems illogical to me.
Griffith himself states that this issue is somewhat cloudy. Because history is not absolutely clear, there is going to be room for disagreement.
I don't know the definite answer, but, Griffith's figures in the chart demonstrate that the idea that Column of Attack was a good way to press a concentrated bayonet charge on an enemy line. One can imagine an enemy line of defense in line formation -- would the bayonet charge have more depth and power if it were executed in Line formation or by putting two Attack Columns on each enemy battalion in line?
This is a worthy issue for the game developers to continue to ponder, because history itself does not provide a definite and clear answer for every Napoleonic battle involving French infantry.
There are two old Napoleonic computer games on Waterloo and Austerlitz that both used the Sid Meier's Gettysburg engine. In these old games, the Attack Column received a Melee bonus when executed against an enemy in Line formation. I can't say for sure that they were absolutely right or maybe wrong, but, that's how they saw it.
Good issue that bears further analysis! Remember that as late as the 1914 campaign in France, the German Third Army under Hauser conducted a successful massive bayonet charge with rifles UNLOADED in order to ensure that the troops did not stop for firefighting. Hauser's second mass bayonet charge day or so later was not very successful -- stopped by the firepower of French 75mm quick firing direct artillery fire.
Last edited by Jean Lafitte on Mon Jun 22, 2015 8:10 am, edited 1 time in total.
Re: How to use ATTACK Columns ?
You are a bit too defensive for my tastes re: Paddy Griffith (who I like and read). But, his tallies are based on a very small sample size and it's impossible to say what really constitutes an "attack."Could you explain why you believe that Paddy Griffith's research and findings are wrong? He wrote his Oxford thesis on this topic, as well as his 2007 book. This is his life's work, which you say is wrong. Can you explain how you have reached your conclusion? Can you explain why you believe your opinion to be more accurate than his work? Thanks.
His credentials are detailed in the wiki article. He was educated at Oxford and worked for Sandhurst and the UK Ministry of Defense.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paddy_Griffith
CWGII -> SMG -> SMA -> WNLB -> ANGV -> TC -> TC2M -> SOW
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Jean Lafitte
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Re: How to use ATTACK Columns ?
I didn't intend to personally offend you. I apologize for any affront.
My point is that Mr. Griffith's analysis and conclusions should hold significant weight. I don't think that he would have included the chart in his book if he thought that it could be qualified and excepted into a meaningless waste of page space. That would be irrational. The chart may not represent the absolute truth -- he admits that the issue remains somewhat cloudy. At the same time, I defend the chart and I say that it should not be qualified and excepted into meaninglessness. It is extremely easy to qualify, except and discount findings of this nature into historical meaninglessness for the purpose holding dear a long-held pre-conceived notion that may not be completely accurate. The interests of historical research and findings sometimes requires us to accept a conclusion that's based on the preponderance of evidence, rather than definitive absolute proof.
What you posted earlier is in accord with what's in the book. Griffith does say that the attack column may not have initially been intended to use as a bayonet attack formation. That probably changed to some extent.
Again, I apologize for any affront. I welcome, recognize and appreciate your mutual interest in these issues. Like you, I enjoy Sid Meiers's Gettysburg, Antietam, WNLB and ANGV.
There are not very many of us Napoleonic enthusiasts in the USA, so, I intend to work hard to be friendly and amicable with all of my fellow enthusiasts. I believe we must stick together and support one another, and I believe that it starts with ME.
My point is that Mr. Griffith's analysis and conclusions should hold significant weight. I don't think that he would have included the chart in his book if he thought that it could be qualified and excepted into a meaningless waste of page space. That would be irrational. The chart may not represent the absolute truth -- he admits that the issue remains somewhat cloudy. At the same time, I defend the chart and I say that it should not be qualified and excepted into meaninglessness. It is extremely easy to qualify, except and discount findings of this nature into historical meaninglessness for the purpose holding dear a long-held pre-conceived notion that may not be completely accurate. The interests of historical research and findings sometimes requires us to accept a conclusion that's based on the preponderance of evidence, rather than definitive absolute proof.
What you posted earlier is in accord with what's in the book. Griffith does say that the attack column may not have initially been intended to use as a bayonet attack formation. That probably changed to some extent.
Again, I apologize for any affront. I welcome, recognize and appreciate your mutual interest in these issues. Like you, I enjoy Sid Meiers's Gettysburg, Antietam, WNLB and ANGV.
There are not very many of us Napoleonic enthusiasts in the USA, so, I intend to work hard to be friendly and amicable with all of my fellow enthusiasts. I believe we must stick together and support one another, and I believe that it starts with ME.
Last edited by Jean Lafitte on Mon Jun 22, 2015 6:44 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Saddletank
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Re: How to use ATTACK Columns ?
This is not practical and would be a grave error of command control. In case of a reverse a brigade commander would always want the option to deploy his columns into firing lines. Thus, each assaulting column (I prefer "Column of Divisions" as that was its correct title) would be placed as far apart as the frontage it would occupy in line. Any less spacing and if a battalion did need to deploy into line it would be unable to due to the proximity of another battalion to its flank. Disorder could follow and defeat soon after that. Columns of Division did not deploy close beside each other but dozens, even 100s of yards apart. It was therefore not possible to concentrate more than one battalion upon a single enemy battalion deployed in line.But the attack idea would be to use TWO battalions in attack column vs each enemy battalion in line. That way the frontages would be equal but the attackers would have much more depth.
In addition to this it is extremely difficult to determine exactly how the sub-units of an enemy formation are deployed when planning a division level attack. You simply often could not see where one enemy battalion ended and another began. Furthermore what about an enemy second line? A wise defender would have a reserve unit behind his front line battalions to contain exactly such a local threat.
The preferred French method to dissuade an enemy line from standing against a columnar attack was to pound it with artillery for an hour or more.
The French army in Spain from 1809 onwards was of very high quality. Only the 1808 army could be described as "second rate". The reason the Peninsular War had such a major effect on Napoleon's European strategy was because the French continuously had to send veteran troops to Spain, keeping them out of the key theatres of Austria, Germany and Russia. Many of Napoleon's finest marechals such as Ney, Soult, Massena, etc were also occupied containing the Anglo-Portuguese-Spanish threat.These methods didn't work in Spain because ...(edit)... the British infantry was way superior to the tired and second rate French infantry in Spain.
I am unsure where you get your information from but the French army of 1815 was the best army Napoleon commanded after 1812. Almost all the troops were veterans and were previously soldiers of Louis XIII's Royal Army - and that was previously Napoleon's 1814 army. Some regiments were newly conscripted, yes, but the core of the army was very experienced. On the other hand, surprisingly, it was the British contingent at Waterloo that lacked veteran troops. There were some Peninsular regiments present but not enough, some had been sent to America at this time.With regard to the quality of the French infantry at Waterloo, really, much of it was conscript-level, I mean, how much training and drill could they have had between being home on the couch in March 1815 to being at Waterloo in mid June 1815? Not much.
Concerning Mr Griffith's figures this is the key factor, as Jim noted:
"This sample includes 15 attacks in echelon; 148 (65%) on rough or narrow ground; and 58 (28%) against British troops."
Given that the numbers include a very significant proportion of column attacks because otherwise the ground was impractical to attack over at all is what is important. We should remove those instances then look again at the percentage of French formations that were not decided for them by the terrain they advanced over. Clearly "rough or narrow ground" can only be understood to be a viable consideration if it means "ground unsuitable for other types of formation of either wider frontage or more susceptible to being disordered" (in other words line and l'ordre mixte). This is why Mr Griffith's statistics need to be studied carefully rather than being accepted as a general overall example of the frequency of different formations used by French infantry to attack an enemy. Fully 2/3rds of the statistical sample is not a true reflection of a French commander's choice of which formation to use but was rather constrained upon local commanders by circumstance.
Last edited by Saddletank on Mon Jun 22, 2015 7:11 pm, edited 1 time in total.
HITS & Couriers - a different and realistic way to play SoW MP.
Re: How to use ATTACK Columns ?
I understand, no affront takenI didn't intend to personally offend you. I apologize for any affront.
My point is that Mr. Griffith's analysis and conclusions should hold significant weight. I don't think that he would have included the chart in his book if he thought that it could be qualified and excepted into a meaningless waste of page space. That would be irrational. The chart may not represent the absolute truth -- he admits that the issue remains somewhat cloudy. At the same time, I defend the chart and I say that it should not be qualified and excepted into meaninglessness. It is extremely easy to qualify, except and discount findings of this nature into historical meaninglessness for the purpose holding dear a long-held pre-conceived notion that may not be completely accurate. The interests of historical research and findings sometimes requires us to accept a conclusion that's based on the preponderance of evidence, rather than definitive absolute proof.
What you posted earlier is in accord with what's in the book. Griffith does say that the attack column may not have initially been intended to use as a bayonet attack formation. That probably changed to some extent.
Again, I apologize for any affront. I welcome, recognize and appreciate your mutual interest in these issues. Like you, I enjoy Sid Meiers's Gettysburg, Antietam, WNLB and ANGV.
There are not very many of us Napoleonic enthusiasts in the USA, so, I intend to work hard to be friendly and amicable with all of my fellow enthusiasts. I believe we must stick together and support one another, and I believe that it starts with ME.
CWGII -> SMG -> SMA -> WNLB -> ANGV -> TC -> TC2M -> SOW
Re: How to use ATTACK Columns ?
To say that the 1815 army was Napoleon's best since 1812 may be true, but it's not saying much. Napoleon's forces 1813-14 were very poor overall.]I am unsure where you get your information from but the French army of 1815 was the best army Napoleon commanded after 1812. Almost all the troops were veterans and were previously soldiers of Louis XIII's Royal Army - and that was previously Napoleon's 1814 army. Some regiments were newly conscripted, yes, but the core of the army was very experienced. On the other hand, surprisingly, it was the British contingent at Waterloo that lacked veteran troops. There were some Peninsular regiments present but not enough, some had been sent to America at this time.
But, the leadership of the 1815 army was very substandard. And some units, like the Middle Guard, were mustered just weeks before the campaign IIRC.
I think if you had to rank the Grande Armee, I'd say something like:
1) 1805
2) 1806
3) 1809
4) 1807
5) 1812
6) 1815
7) 1813
8) 1814
Last edited by IronBMike on Mon Jun 22, 2015 8:00 pm, edited 1 time in total.
CWGII -> SMG -> SMA -> WNLB -> ANGV -> TC -> TC2M -> SOW