Union Retreat

[ironsight]

Little Powell, yes indeed, its

fun to imagine the possible scenario's.

I doubt seriously even in he best scenario with the best of luck, Lee could of destroyed the AOP. Cause them to retreat or redeploy, possibly...might even route a brigade or two but destroy the AOP in detail? These were veterans same as Lee's troops and they would be fighting on their own soil defending it with no supply issues.

Once the lines were solidly drawn by the 2nd day especially with the Reb failure to take the high grounds, i believe the writing was on the wall for Lee. Among the obvious obstacles Lee also suffered from some bad generaling from his subordinates.

Lee:
General Meade has been forcing the march.
The weather has been unusually hot.
He will probably arrive here worn out
and weary, piece by piece.
If we concentrate, we can hit him as he comes up.
If we can take out a few of his corps, we can even the odds.
But we must strike hard
and we must strike quickly.

Lee:
- My instructions were clear?
- Yes, sir. To all commanders.
Avoid contact with the enemy
until the army's up and concentrated.
And General Heth?
He has instructions not to force major action.
I told him this morning.
We should move closer to the front.
Send for General Heth.

Heth:
I thought it was only a few militia,
but it was dismounted cavalry, sir.
There weren't all that many, and the boys wouldn't hold back.
I thought we shouldn't be stopped by a few dismounted cavalry...
but they made a good fight.
They really put up a scrap, sir.
Lee:
Go on, General.
Heth:
Well, sir, they wouldn't leave.
My boys got their dander up.
We deployed the whole division and went after them.
We just about had them running then all of a sudden...
they got infantry support.
We got pushed back.
Then we re-formed and tried again.
We couldn't just leave it to them, sir.
Now there's more Yankee infantry coming.
I don't know how many.
But I don't know what else we could've done.
It started as a minor scrap with a few militia.
The next thing I know,
I'm tangling with half the Union army.
Lee:
Things will get out of control, Mr. Heth.
That is why we have orders.

Lee:
I can't imagine what has happened to General Stuart.
- I've heard nothing. Do you understand?
- Yes, sir.
I have no idea of what lies in front of me.
It may be the entire federal army.

Lee:
Tell General Ewell the federal troops
are withdrawing in confusion.
We must only push those people in order to gain the heights.
Tell him to take that hill, if practical.
The one beyond the town.

Lee:
I ordered firing on that hill,
but no cannons are firing.
- Send over and find out why.

Longstreet:
What are you thinking, General?
Maybe we should not have fought here.
Lee:
I know that. But we have prevailed.
The men have prevailed.
Longstreet:
Yes. They've always done that.
But in the morning,we may be outnumbered...
and they'll be entrenched on the high ground.
Lee:
You know as well as I, we've never been
concerned with being outnumbered.
Longstreet:
That is true, sir. You are right.
If we move south to Washington, they have to pursue us.
Then we can fight on ground of our choosing.
Lee:
But the enemy is here.
We did not want the fight, but the fight is here.
How can I ask this army to retreat
in the face of what they've done this day?
Longstreet:
Not retreat, sir. Re-deploy.
Lee:
Our guns will move them off that hill or Ewell will push them off.
But if Meade is there tomorrow,
I can't move this army away.
I will attack him.
Longstreet:
If Meade is up there tomorrow,
it is because he wants us to attack him.
We pushed back two corps, but there are five more coming.

Gen. Trimble to Lee:
We could've taken that hill.
God in his wisdom knows we should've taken it.
There was no one there at all and it commanded the town.
General Gordon saw it.
I mean, he was with us.
Me and Ewell and Gordon...
all standing in the dark like idiots with that bloody damned hill empty.
I beg your pardon, General.
That bloody damned hill was bare as his bloody damned head!
We all saw it, as God is my witness.
We were all there.
I said to him, "General Ewell,
we have got to take that hill."
General Jackson wouldn't have stopped
with them on the run...and plenty of light
on a hill like that empty.
God help us!
I said to General Ewell these words...
I said to him:
"Sir, give me one division and I will take that hill."
He said nothing.
He just stood there and stared at me.
I said, "General Ewell, give me one brigade...
"and I will take that hill."
I was becoming disturbed, sir.
And General Ewell put his arms behind him and blinked.
So I said,
"General, give me one regiment..."and I will take that hill."
And he said nothing.
He just stood there.
I threw down my sword.
Down on the ground in front of him.
We could have done it, sir.
A blind man should have seen it.
Now they're working up there.
You can hear the axes of the federal troops.
And so in the morning...many a good boy will die...
taking that hill.

Lee:
It was very close this afternoon.
They nearly broke.
I could feel them breaking.
There for a moment I thought I saw our flags go up the hill.
Longstreet:
It wasn't that close.
Lee:
The attacks were not properly
coordinated. I do not know why.
And nevertheless, we nearly won the day.
I could see a clear road all the way to Washington.
Longstreet:
The federals still hold the heights.
And they're reinforced.
General?
That way around to the right is still open.
Lee:
I will think on it, General.
Longstreet:
We have enough artillery
for one more good fight, but just one.

[Little Powell]

ironsight - You're probably right, it was pretty hopeless for Lee at that point but again we'll never know for sure. I agree with Dale though that it was all about survival for the Confederacy at that point. Even though Lee wanted it to end as soon as possible which is why he was so aggressive at Gettysburg. Maybe deep down, he knew they would lose.. And he was willing to accept defeat at that point. But, the war did go on for two more years..

[dale]

Ironsight,

The dialogue in "Gettysburg" follows the threads we have been discussing here. Memoirs written years after the battle are always tinged with the bias of the writer, some to justify, some to condemn. Like most docudramas the writers imagined what took place and then created a dialogue, except this one was based on what Sharaa imagined in his novel "The Killer Angels" and created. So in a sense it is a fabrication twice removed from what happened. It becomes embellished with each telling so that it becomes the myth of Gettysburg.

[ironsight]

So in a sense it is a fabrication twice removed from what happened. It becomes embellished with each telling so that it becomes the myth of Gettysburg.

AHH! but the end result, the historical facts of that battle, how it ended, its aftermath are no fabrication or myth.

Did Ewell fail to even consider taking Culp's Hill on the 1st day when he could of easily done so?
The Reb simultaneous attacks on the 2nd day against the right and left flanks of the federals did not happen as Lee planned.
Where was Stuart?
Longstreet did suggest a redeployment and also attacking around the federal left flank. Longstreet knew the value of a defensive battle especially when facing greater odds. It was no accident immediately following the failure of Pickett's charge the Federals yelled Fredericksburg!, Fredericksburg!....

And at the end of the disastorous 3rd day did Lee say:
'Its all my fault' 'I thought we were invincible' or something to that effect.

We all have the advantage of Monday morning quarterbacking these days. But what still baffles me is why Lee thought he could successfully invade the North again after his disastorous Maryland campaign. Its a good bet if anyone except McClellan was in command of the Federal Army at Antietam or if AP Hill didn't show up in the nick of time to attack the flank of the last Federal assault, Lee's Army would of been destroyed right then and there. Lee held out at Antietam as well as he did all things considered because he had good interior lines, the same as the Federals at Gburg.
And then there was the imminent fall of Vicksburg while Lee proposed to march up North.
Chancellorsville is the only thing i can come up with.

[dale]

We all have the advantage of Monday morning quarterbacking these days. But what still baffles me is why Lee thought he could successfully invade the North again after his disastorous Maryland campaign.

When was there a better time to invade the North?

Lee could not help Vicksburg by sending his troops there. Imagine how long that journey would have taken. Like I had said earlier he chose this time to invade because the Union had just been defeated at Chancellorsville and a lot of its two year enlistments were expiring. The Maryland campaign was a disaster only because Lee's general orders fell into McClellan's hands. Prior to that he had captured 10,000 Union soldiers at Harpers Ferry, driven all Federals completely out of the Shanandoah Valley and taken the war out of Virginia soil. The campaign had a very auspicious beginning. At Antietam Lee was not driven from the field. Every Union assault was checked so that by nightfall McClellan could not claim a battlefield victory. When Lee did chose to withdraw across the Potomac he withdrew basically unimpeded by McClellan. So once McClellan saw that Lee had eluded him he claimed a huge victory. By most accounts the battle was a draw. Lee's army escaped destruction. McClellan was later sacked for actually accomplishing so little with the opportunity that fell into his lap.

I am sure in Lee's mind he was not bothered by Antietam because he knew that the chance of a Union general gaining the complete disposition of his battleplan again was remote. Lee probably considered the first Maryland campaign as one that was prematurely ended by horrible bad luck.

If Lee could have beaten the AOP on its home territory that would surely have taken a lot of the sting out of Grant's successes in the West. At the very least it would have kept the North from mounting another offensive in East for many months. At most it could have so dispirited the Northern population that the Peace factions would have become the dominant political force in key states. It was surely a gamble but the rewards of a victory were immense.

If Lee had instead chosen to send a corps to the Western theatre he would have completely given up the initiative and found himself in the same perilous position of awaiting the next inevitable massing of a Union AOP of over 100,000 men.

[JC Edwards]

dale wrote:

We all have the advantage of Monday morning quarterbacking these days. But what still baffles me is why Lee thought he could successfully invade the North again after his disastorous Maryland campaign.

When was there a better time to invade the North?

Lee could not help Vicksburg by sending his troops there. Imagine how long that journey would have taken. Like I had said earlier he chose this time to invade because the Union had just been defeated at Chancellorsville and a lot of its two year enlistments were expiring. The Maryland campaign was a disaster only because Lee's general orders fell into McClellan's hands. Prior to that he had captured 10,000 Union soldiers at Harpers Ferry, driven all Federals completely out of the Shanandoah Valley and taken the war out of Virginia soil. The campaign had a very auspicious beginning. At Antietam Lee was not driven from the field. Every Union assault was checked so that by nightfall McClellan could not claim a battlefield victory. When Lee did chose to withdraw across the Potomac he withdrew basically unimpeded by McClellan. So once McClellan saw that Lee had eluded him he claimed a huge victory. By most accounts the battle was a draw. Lee's army escaped destruction. McClellan was later sacked for actually accomplishing so little with the opportunity that fell into his lap.

I am sure in Lee's mind he was not bothered by Antietam because he knew that the chance of a Union general gaining the complete disposition of his battleplan again was remote. Lee probably considered the first Maryland campaign as one that was prematurely ended by horrible bad luck.

If Lee could have beaten the AOP on its home territory that would surely have taken a lot of the sting out of Grant's successes in the West. At the very least it would have kept the North from mounting another offensive in East for many months. At most it could have so dispirited the Northern population that the Peace factions would have become the dominant political force in key states. It was surely a gamble but the rewards of a victory were immense.

If Lee had instead chosen to send a corps to the Western theatre he would have completely given up the initiative and found himself in the same perilous position of awaiting the next inevitable massing of a Union AOP of over 100,000 men.

"Well, I've got to hand it to you George (Dale).......you certainly have a talent for Trivializing the Momentous and Complicating the Obvious!"

[ironsight]

dale Wrote:When was there a better time to invade the North?

IMO, short answer, never!... considering the imbalance of logistics and manpower between the two sides.

The way i look at it, the South invading the greater North is like feeding a frozen bar of butter into a red hot pan and watching it melt. That analogy unfortunately for the Confederates is what happened at Antietam and then Gburg.

What if Lee in 1863 still had all those killed and wounded from the Antietam and Gburg invasions under his command? What if he could still rely on the excellent morale of the battles he brilliantly won on his own soil?
What if Lee instead of launching grandios 'hail mary' type 'major' invasions instead mounted limited quick hit'n run temporary captures and/or raids of Northern cities and such to keep the Federalis geussing, constantly moving and redeploying thus prolonging the war indefinitely as Lincoln once thought it would? Would enough of these limited hit 'n run attacks finally cause the Northern public to lose faith in the Federal Army and in essence the Lincoln administration to protect them?

As far as Vicksburg, Grant could of been kicked out with a little strategic thinking making that almost in par as a Lee victory would of been at Gburg. Lee could easily spare some Divisions augmented with whatever Jonhston mustered along with Bragg's Army. Similar happened at the great Confederate victory at Chicamaugua. Of course Rosecran in Tennessee would have to be dealt with first.

In retrospect not only did the once 'invinceable' Lee retreat from Gburg but Vicksburg fell simultaneously loosing another of Pembroke's 18,000 or so troops there but more importantly it allowed Grant a victory to go on and accecpt Lee's surrender at Appomatix Court House.
The turning point of the war far as i can tell was the fall of Vicksburg.

[Gfran64]

I think the reason Lee went North again was because he was asked to by Richmond. He may not have liked it or thought it was the most militarily prudent but politics always trumps generalship. If Richmond asked him to relieve Virginia to improve the political environment in the South then he was obliged to do so. Whether a defeat of the AOP in north ends the war favorably for the South I'm not so sure. Lee milling around Pennsylvania may have driven up enlistments in the North. It was very hard for the AOP to fight in Virginia and it was very hard for the ANV to fight out of Virginia.

I have found that the more I read on these topics, the less critical I have become of the Generals so frequently faulted by modern day historians. These were for the most part great men with great intellects and a firm understanding of their craft. They performed the best that they could with the men and equipment they had. Their mistakes were paid for with their own soldier's blood and live's and possibly their own.

Meade did not perform any spectacular military maneuvers at Gettysburg because he didn't need to. Lee did the same thing at Fredricksburg. I fairness to Meade, he only got command of the AOP 3 days before the Battle Gettysburg and didn't arrive on the field until after the 1st day. He might not have been the best General but he wasn't a slug either. He conducted the only successful Union attack at Fredricksburg, against Jackson of all people. His recovery on the 2nd day after Sickle's Folly/Salient was a pretty good example of his generalship. In consideration of Sickle's unauthorized advance. Remember that at Chancellorsville, he reported to Hooker that Jackson was leaving his front and asked permission to press forward but was denied. He was later removed from good defensive ground at Hazel Grove against his wishes. The Confederates later occupied that ground and beat him into the earth with artillery fire. He was assigned a position by Meade at Gettysburg on the Union left. He was to tie into II Corp on his right and LRT on his left. The problem is that between those 2 positions is a hole with a rise if front of it with a terrible field of fire. Now did Sickles,(the only Union Corp Commander not to graduate from West Point), take what he had learned at Chancellorsville and apply it to this situation, seeking better ground further forward? Did he also suspect a flanking maneuver to the Union right or left? I have no idea. But the ground in front of him didn't start to get better until he was about 1/2 to 3/4 of a mile ahead of II Corp's position. Should he have notified Hancock and Meade, absolutely!

Ironsite, I think you're right. Vicksburg was the beginning of the end. The Emancipation Proclamation followed, which lead to 300,000 new black Union soldiers, then Lt Gen Grant, then Lincoln's reelection primarily won with the soldier vote. 8 out of 10 Western Theater Union soldiers voted for Lincoln and 7 out of 10 from the AOP. Then a Constitutional Amendment against slavery. The soldiers of the Union reelected Lincoln because they wanted to win the war even though it may cost them their lives. They had a personal investment in the war's outcome. Peace alone was not good enough for them. I think that even if Lee beats the AOP at Gettysburg, the soldier vote still goes to Lincoln and he wins reelection. So long as Lincoln is President for another 4 years and Grant is General of the Armies the final outcome is almost certain.

Greg

[dale]

It was very hard for the AOP to fight in Virginia and it was very hard for the ANV to fight out of Virginia.

I agree that it was harder for the offensive force to fight in enemy territory. On the other hand having the AOP in Virginia was disruptive in so many ways. Securing the Valley for the growing and harvesting season was vital for Virginia and for sustaining the Confederate troops and the civilian population.

Ironsite, I think you're right. Vicksburg was the beginning of the end. The Emancipation Proclamation followed, which lead to 300,000 new black Union soldiers, then Lt Gen Grant, then Lincoln's reelection primarily won with the soldier vote. 8 out of 10 Western Theater Union soldiers voted for Lincoln and 7 out of 10 from the AOP. Then a Constitutional Amendment against slavery. The soldiers of the Union reelected Lincoln because they wanted to win the war even though it may cost them their lives. They had a personal investment in the war's outcome. Peace alone was not good enough for them. I think that even if Lee beats the AOP at Gettysburg, the soldier vote still goes to Lincoln and he wins reelection. So long as Lincoln is President for another 4 years and Grant is General of the Armies the final outcome is almost certain.

The Emancipation Proclamation was enabled by the turning back of Lee at Antietam. The vote for Lincoln took place in November 1864. At that time Grant was beseiging Petersburg. This was a continuation of a campaign that started at The Wilderness six months earlier. As you know it was the first campaign of the Union AOP that did not end in a retreat. The Union soldiers sensed that they had Lee in a grim death grip for once and did not want to let go. Atlanta had fallen by September 1864. The Weldon Railroad had been cut to Petersburg/Richmond in September 1864. Grant was able to keep Lee from reinforcing Georgia and Sherman kept Confederate forces from reinforcing Lee so that he could not go again on the offensive. As long as the South was locked in a purely defensive struggle the end was indeed certain. Lee's ability to attack is what had kept the hopes of the South alive and what kept the North at bay. By November 1864 there was no reason for the Northern electorate to think that the South could continue the war for a full year longer. If Lee had won at Gettysburg, he would of had a much better chance of delaying the North's successes that lead to the 1864 political victory of Lincoln.

[ironsight]

dale, Greg, some good points.
Yep dale, by late 1864 things looked grim for the South no doubt about it. Effectively blockaded, starving, Federals controlled the Mississippi effectively cutting the CSA in half, Georgia's industrial base shut down so on and so on.
The one bright side and glimmer of hope was in late 1863, the Confederate victory at Chicamauga. But that victory was short lived and squandered by bad Conferderate generaling once again, namely Braxton Bragg.

As long as the South was locked in a purely defensive struggle the end was indeed certain. Lee's ability to attack is what had kept the hopes of the South alive and what kept the North at bay.

I'll agree with this later on in the war because in late 1864 Lee had no choice but to go on the pure defensive. Longstreet's Tennessee Campaign was pretty much a failure never accomplishing his goals. Early in the war, Lee did have the invasion option and as history tells us, he unfortunately used that strategy twice.

As i mentioned earlier, i think a better strategy to keep his Army intact and morale up would of been to stage perhaps Division level supported by a large cavalry contingencies hit 'n run raids across the border in Northern cities where the Federal Army was scarce or easy pickins. Keep the Federals moving, geussing and constantly redeploying. And their still would always be the fear of a large Lee invasion also.
If effective, Lincoln would of seen to accelerating the attacks into Virginia long before Grant arrived on the scene. And then there would be Lee doing what he did best, defending Virginia with a much larger Army (no Antietam/Gburg) and repulse these attacks.
Basically these cat 'n mouse tactics might of possibly prolonged the war enough to force a stalemate hopefully leading to a peace truce.

Greg Wrote:Lee milling around Pennsylvania may have driven up enlistments in the North. It was very hard for the AOP to fight in Virginia and it was very hard for the ANV to fight out of Virginia.

I totally agree.
If milling around in Pa, Oh, Maryland, etc. with hit 'n run raids increased Northern enlistments, then i'd say the strategy was working.