dale, your comments are thought provoking as always
Yes, i'm sure Lee wanted a knockout punch and in Northern territory to boot. But no matter what the initial troop ratios were at Gburg, the odds were in the long run against a successful campaign especially if it included the capture of Washington.
The Federals were well supplied, had the advantage of overall numbers and more important they would be determined as they would be defending their own soil.
The big question however, would a Meade retreat or redeployment from Gburg be enough to gain foreign recognition of the CSA? Would it be enough to get Lincoln to order Grant to pick up his seige toys and move to defend Washington? Maybe! But i doubt Grant would of moved as Vicksburg was a big prize and ready to fall at the time of Gburg.
I think if Grant did anything he would of mustered Federal forces in the occupied South and marched on Richmond while Lee was up north, thats what i would of done.
If Lee did march on Washington, his Army by the time it got there would be either destroyed in detail or would cease to be any kind of serious threat thus ending the war.
Yep, blunders, mistakes, miscalculations and just bad generaling were made by the North. They could afford the blunders because of their manpower, economy, etc. whereas the South could not afford blunders if it was to succeed.
Lee hated seige warfare from what I can figure. Washington was ringed with forts. The Army of Northern Virginia fought best when it fought a mobile battle. Lee won battles by concentrating a superior force on only a part of the AOP or by forcing the AOP to attack on his terms. I seriously doubt that Lee presented more than a threat to the East coast cities of the North. However, the threat alone was enough to create astronomical tensions within the Lincoln administration. If Lee could defeat the AOP then he would have created a vacuum of military power in the east that would have unleashed untold political forces. (In 1864 Union cities had to be garrisoned to quell rioting. Keep in mind that this was after the victories in Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Just imagine this same situation if Gettysburg had been lost.)
Greg has pointed out that to threaten New York, Lee would of had to cross the Susquehanna. Why would Lee have to actually take a city? He could have a devastating affect by just existing as a force north of the Potomac. By defeating the AOP Lincoln have no recourse but to concentrate all the energies of the administation to deal with Lee's army. It would not save Vicksburg but it would alter the whole strategy of the war. It would buy time for the South.
What was Grant's strategy for actually winning the war? It rested on the premise that the AOP and the Army of the James and several divisions in the Shanandoah would all simultaneously pressure Lee on three fronts. As long as constant pressure could be applied to Lee then he could not dispatch troops to reinforce the Western theatre. Lee's attack into Pennsylvania turns this strategy on its head.
The gamble for Lee was that he would be trapped north of the Potomac. If that was the case then a second Antietam would result. (After Gettysburg Lee was trapped by flood waters for two days north of the Potomac. Luckily for him Meade was in command and the Union army could not seize this amazing opportunity.)
Lee has been second guessed for 150 years. The first invasion of the North in 1862 was based upon the false premise that Maryland was a state that actually wanted to join the South but was held in check solely by the Federal presence. The second invasion was not so naive, it was an attack that the Southern leaders thought could lead to the North suing for peace.
Lee had roughly only 75,000 troops at Gburg, long supply line, limited ammo and in enemy territory. IMO, he could not have stayed up North for any prolonged period of time before his Army succombed to attrition. He eventually would find himself surrounded, continually attacked and Union cavalry harassing to no end.
Gburg was just too close to the big Northern cities which allowed relatively easy Union reenforcements and supplies. Lee might of had a better chance if he initially targeted an area further West such southern Ohio but then he'd even be further away from Richmond.
I still think, the South should of stayed in its own territory and fought a defensive war instead of mounting three major invasions of the North all of which failed. Because none of those invasions succeeded in their objectives they were in the end a waste of manpower lowering moral which the South could not afford.
I agree Grant finally had the right idea on how to win the war. His disasterous defeat at Cold Harbor didn't sway him one bit to retreat as earlier Union generals would have done. But then again, Grant had overwhelming numbers, good supply lines and the Lincoln's blessing to press on to Richmond at all hazards. By that time Atlanta, Vicksburg and other cities in Sherman's path were out of the picture. The Confederate Western Army was for all practical purposes neutralized.
The fall of Vicksburg was the big tragedy for the South as it allowed Grant to finally invade Virginia for the last time.
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Below is Lincoln's letter intended for Gen. Meade following Gettysburg. It outlines his dissatisfaction with Meade's performance after the battle. Lincoln for sure would of pressured Meade to attack Lee under any alternate scenario which might of developed. Lincoln never sent the letter.
Major General Meade
I have just seen your despatch to Gen. Halleck, asking to be relieved of your command, because of a supposed censure of mine. I am very--very--grateful to you for the magnificent success you gave the cause of the country at Gettysburg; and I am sorry now to be the author of the slightest pain to you. But I was in such deep distress myself that I could not restrain some expression of it. I had been oppressed nearly ever since the battles at Gettysburg, by what appeared to be evidences that yourself, and Gen. Couch, and Gen. Smith, were not seeking a collision with the enemy, but were trying to get him across the river without another battle. What these evidences were, if you please, I hope to tell you at some time, when we shall both feel better. The case, summarily stated is this. You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated; and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him, till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure, without attacking him. And Couch and Smith! The latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinary calculation, to have aided you in the last battle at Gettysburg; but he did not arrive. At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is not an inch over fifty-five miles, if so much. And Couch's movement was very little different.
Again, my dear general, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how can you possibly do so South of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, and I do not expect you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it.
I beg you will not consider this a prosecution, or persecution of yourself As you had learned that I was dissatisfied, I have thought it best to kindly tell you why.
Abraham Lincoln
ironsight - Have you read the book "Gettysburg: A Novel of the Civil War by Newt Gingrich"?
*SPOILER ALERT* If you plan to read the novell.
The book imagines a Confederate victory at Gettysburg which really could have worked and could have lead to the CSA winning the war.
After getting pounded on the first day of the battle, Lee takes his forces on a flanking march around the Union left and seizes the supply depot at Westminster. Since the AOTP is now cut off from their supplies (and Washington for that matter), they have no choice but to leave Gettysburg and attack Lee on ground of his choosing. I think Longstreet suggested a similar plan at the real battle but Lee wouldn't accept it.
Yes, Gettysburg was close to the big Northern cities, but they were only garrisoned with green militia at the time. The AOTP was the only worthy force protecting Washington, and if Lee would have destroyed the AOTP he could have taken Washington and destroyed the Union.
So I think it was right for Lee to bring the war to the north, but his over aggressive actions at Gettysburg and not listening to his Old War Horse cost him that battle.
Last edited by Little Powell on Tue Jan 20, 2009 11:24 am, edited 1 time in total.
Little Powell,
A ninety-two old lady urged me to read Gingrich's books on the Civil War last week. I shall do so very soon!
Ironsight,
I agree that had Lee stayed north of the Potomac Meade would of had to attack him. This does not mean that Meade could have defeated Lee by attacking him. Lee would have chosen a place to make a stand and the Union would have to attack Lee on defensible terrain. Meade had to guard Lee from striking out in several directions which meant that Meade had to detach numbers of his men and position them to delay any move Lee would make. This would have given Lee the option of taking on garrison size units (such as the 10,000 who surrendured at Harpers Ferry the year before). Lee could have parried Meade's thrusts for a while unless Meade committed all of his troops (and no Union commander had done that yet). The longer Lee could engage the North without committing to a serious battle the more the South benefitted.
There is nothing in Meade's character that showed him to be aggresive--he was the anti-Hooker in this aspect. Lincoln's letter to Meade voiced the same feelings that I would have felt: Meade was too cautious and would not seize an opportunity. Lee had lost a huge percentage of his army and had expended most of his heavy munitions and yet Meade did not actively pursue him. How aggresive would Meade have been if Gettysburg had not yet been fought and Lee was at full strength? I think Meade was treated kindly by history and fate because he had the advantage of being the defender on high terrain at Gettysburg.
Assuming Lee took Cemetary Ridge, the big wild card would be how much artillery ammo would he have to fend off a large scale counter attack from Meade. Hopefully, he'd acquire any captured guns and ammo. I don't believe he could of relied on a supplies from Virginia as the rains following the 3rd day swelled the rivers.. at least in the short term. Even if supply trains tried to get to his Army, would the Unionn cavalry harass and/or capture it?
And what would Lee's troop levels be after the mythical capture of Cemetary Ridge?
Little Powell, this scenario predisposes Lee would of done that. Longstreet argued similar plans and Lee would have none of it. Considering Lee's mule-headed demeanor at Gburg, the only real chance of some kind of victory there would of been the early taking of Culp's Hill, then fortifying it. If that was done and the Confederates succeeded in pocessing Cemetary Ridge, then all kinds of possibilities would be open.
Even if that all happened, i think Lee would of still not listened to his Generals.
Under no scenario could i see where Lee could have taken Washington with the amount of troops he would of had once he got there. The Union Army would be shadowing him all the way either with outright attacks or serious harassment, then what? Surrounded? Remember also Washington was highly fortified. If Lee was foolish to try and take Washington, IMO the war would of ended right then and there.
Was there any plans to bolster Lee's command with western divisions, a Longstreet plan reversed? Braggs' divisions is what I had in mind. A What-if scenerio with some of those forces included at GB might make for an interesting mod.
The Union Army would be shadowing him all the way either with outright attacks or serious harassment, then what? Surrounded? Remember also Washington was highly fortified. If Lee was foolish to try and take Washington, IMO the war would of ended right then and there.
Well that's just it, if Lee could have destroyed the AOTP like he intended to, there would not have been a Union Army to shadow him on the way to Washington. At least not one close enough to be able to reach him in time. With the AOTP out of the picture and their supplies in the hands of the CSA, it just might have been possible for Lee to take Washington. At that time, Washington was terrified of Lee and his Army and could have surrendered when put under siege. Who knows what could have happened, but it's fun to imagine the possible scenario's.
Last edited by Little Powell on Tue Jan 20, 2009 11:50 pm, edited 1 time in total.
I doubt that an army in the field can be destroyed. Most battles ended when one of the armies had sufferred casualties of between 15% to 30%. I think Franklin was the only case that an army was destroyed other than being surrounded in seige. No matter how climactic the battle against the AOP would have been there would still be a large force of soldiers that will have survived the battle. Lee would always have to be aware of its presence and it would factor into any move he made. No matter what happened to the AOP it would always retreat toward Washington, that was its "prime directive" in Star Trek terms.
Later in the war Jubal Early lead his division out of the Shanandoah Vally in a quick striking raid towards Washington. The battle that resulted was an action fought outside of the ring of forts, but close enough to scare Lincoln. To me this would be the pattern of engagement that Lee would offer to the Feds if he had beaten the AOP. He would have sent about 15000 men on a quick strike against a major city with the intention of disrupting the intentions of the Federals to mass against one target. He never would of had enough men to seize, occupy and hold a city and still have a large enough field army. By feinting in many directions he could have tied down so many Federals in garrison duty that he could have stayed in the field across the Potomac for some time. You have to remember that the States still controlled a good number of troops themselves. If the governor of a threatened state demanded more protection against raids, Lincoln would have to comply--diverting resources away from the AOP.
The South would then be that much closer to winning the war because the Union had a clock ticking against it. Time was the friend of the South--all it had to do was survive, not conquer.
