Please refer to Artillery posts 1 and 2 as needed.
General George Gordon Meade, after action report, Fredricksburg
These batteries immediately opened on the enemy's battery, and, in conjunction with some of General Doubleday's batteries in our rear, on the other side of the Bowling Green road, after twenty minutes' firing, silenced and compelled the withdrawal of the guns…... Cooper's, Amsden's, and Ransom's batteries were immediately turned on it, and after about thirty minutes' rapid firing the enemy abandoned the guns, having had two of his limbers or caissons blown up…….the enemy opened a battery which completely enfiladed us from the right flank. After holding our ground for some time, no support arriving, we were compelled to fall back to the railroad.
General Thomas Jackson, after action report, Fredricksburg
The exact range of the hill having been accurately obtained by much previous firing, the loss at this point was heavy…………….His batteries reserved their fire until the enemy's lines came within less than 800 yards, when the fourteen guns opened, pouring such a storm of shot and shell into his ranks as to cause him first to halt, then to waver, and at last seek shelter by flight.
Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, after action report, Fredricksburg
These three divisions lost many gallant officers and men in repeated and fruitless attempts to carry positions of great natural strength, made stronger by the unremitting labor of weeks, and held by an enemy in strong force, who fought under cover, aided by a tremendous fire of artillery, while such was the nature of the ground that we could derive little support from our own guns.
Massachusetts private-
(At Gettysburg...)
The hoarse and indistinguishable orders of commanding officers, the screaming and bursting of shells, canister and shrapnel as they tore through the struggling masses of humanity, the death screams of wounded animals, the groans of their human companions, wounded and dying and trampled underfoot by hurrying batteries, riderless horses and the moving lines of battle-a perfect Hell on earth, never, perhaps to be equaled, certainly not to be surpassed, nor ever to be forgotten in a man's lifetime. It has never been effaced from my memory, day or night, for fifty year.
Major Charles Shiels Wainwright, 1st Corp Artillery Commander, Gettysburg
After I left the road they got some pieces on the crest we had just left, and fired into the tail of our column, smashing up three of Stewart's caissons. The rascals south of the road, too, killed the off-wheeler of Lieutenant Wilbur's last piece; and when he had just got him cut out and was starting again, they shot down three more horses, his own horse, and one of the drivers. So the gun was abandoned. I was terribly grieved when I heard of it, for I had begun to look upon our getting off from that place as quite a feat and wished that it could have been without the loss of a gun.
General John Gibbon, Day 3 at Gettysburg
I had made but a few steps when three of Cushing's limber boxes blew up at once, sending the contents in a vast column of dense smoke high up in the air.
Every moment or so one would burst, throwing its fragments about in a most disagreeably promiscuous manner, or first striking the ground, plough a great furrow in the earth and rocks... throwing these last about in a way quite as dangerous as the pieces of the exploding shell.
Charles Reed, 9th Massachusetts Battery, Gettysburg Day 2, A great account of the dirty business of taking a gun.
Closely watching the shifting Confederates, Bigelow found that "as soon as the woods were reached, they sent a body of sharpshooters against us." The Confederates, came up on my left front as skirmishers, pouring in a heavy fire and killing and wounding a number of...my men.
Drivers coached their straining horse teams as they dragged the heavy guns through the pasture south of the Trostle buildings. Gunners rammed charges down the hot muzzles as they moved, stopping briefly to fire the weapons, "keeping Kershaw’s skirmishers back with canister, and the other two sections bowling solid shot towards Barksdale’s men.
The captain ordered all the ammunition laid beside the guns for "rapid firing."
My battery was discharged at them, every gun loaded...with double shotted cannister and solid shot, after which through the smoke we caught a glimpse of the enemy, they were torn and broken, but still advancing. The enemy opened a fearful musketry fire, men and horses were falling like hail.... Sergeant after sergeant, was struck down, horses were plunging and laying about all around.
Canister ammunition began to run low as Bigelow ordered case shot with the fuses cut short to be used, so that they would explode near the muzzle of the guns.
Hand to hand fighting engulfed the battery, the men using handspikes and rammers to defend their guns.
The men abandoned the death trap and made their way to the rear, leaving behind the shattered remains of the battery and a sacrifice of three of four officers, six of eight sergeants, 19 enlisted men, 88 horses and four of their six guns.
This is my 3rd and final post in this series. It deals with more practical suggestions as to how the use of artillery may be modified to more realistically simulate the actual tactics used by commanders in the ACW. I am well aware that none of these changes are probably going to make it into the new game as the team has its hands full at the moment. These are suggestions for future game modifications.
The AOP had had about 360 cannon present at Gettysburg. They were arranged in about 68 batteries. To the best of my calculations, they had some 7480 horses working in these batteries. There were 52 infantry brigades and 8 cavalry brigades. Given that, I would suggest that the loss of a battery of artillery was about as significant as a loss of an infantry brigade. One could argue that it was more significant due to the loss off equipment, horses, ammunition and supplies. Not to mention that the captured piece was a net gain in artillery for the enemy. I can’t say for sure what the scoring is currently, but I do believe that the loss of a battery very much undervalued in TC2M.
The biggest difference between the use of artillery in TC2M and the actual war was that most times the artillery was deployed well behind the infantry. Was this due to the fear of loosing the guns to enemy infantry or was the artillery more effective at greater ranges? I think both cases are true. The loss of part or all of a battery was truly a significant loss. Also, the artillery was effective at greater ranges. The key to getting it correct in the new game, I think, is to make the player push the artillery back in the formation. This can be accomplished in two ways.
Firstly, a rethinking of effective ordinance ranges needs to be considered. It seems that ACW artillery could start to effectively put metal on a target at about 800 yards. TC2M requires that the user move his artillery to within 200 yards of the enemy to be of any significant use. This was not at all true in the ACW. Canister was routinely used at ranges of between 300-400 yards. Case was a suitable substitute for canister at close ranges. Solid shot was also somewhat effective especially if it enfiladed the target. This is reflective of the actual tactics used in the civil war.
Counter battery fire needs to be made more effective. It is well supported in the literature. I have been able to find that indeed enemy batteries were silenced or driven from the field many times by effective counter battery fire at ranges of much greater than 800 yards.
Secondly, there needs to be very significant penalties for the loss of artillery pieces, their men and horses. I can’t stress this point enough.
There should be an elevation bonus for your artillery. If your battery is higher than the enemy battery then that battery is functionally closer to you than you are to it. This makes your fire more effective than theirs.
A battery should be able to fire mixed rounds within the battery at longer and shorter ranges.
It would be nice to set the target of the battery on an as needed basis.
A battery should have a conserve ammunition button that would slow the rate of fire but would enjoy an accuracy bonus due to improved aiming.
A battery should not be able to fire through its own formation. I would say that the end units could have a firing radius of about 120-150 degrees from its front. The center units would be only about 70 degrees from their front. Any more than that and they would be hitting the gun next to them. The battery would have a no fire zone directly to its rear as that is where the caissons and limbers/horses/men would be.
Losses of horses, caisson and limbers are not possible in TC2M. It would be nice, and I’m not asking for a separate sprite, if the battery had to accommodate for the loss of these critical support pieces. Perhaps it could be tracked some way and displayed on the gun’s ammunition screen. If a gun lost its limber/caisson/horses then it had to be pushed and it would loose 1/3, (limber) to 2/3’s, (caisson) of its available ammunition. There were typically spares in the battery to the rear. I’m not sure if you wish to get that detailed.
There were reserve men in the battery that would take over for men who were wounded within the battery. So even if a gun suffered casualties it would have only fired a few rounds before replacements arrived.
Re-suppply should be accomplished by sending the caisson to the ammunition wagon. Not the other way around. Maybe a re-supply button could be pressed and a time would pass, say 10 minutes if the wagon was close, and then the gun would be re-supplied. No sprite needed.
Ammunition wagons should be able to be hit by artillery as well as general officers.
The longer a battery stays in one spot, the more accurate its fire becomes. This just stands to reason. Likewise, the more stationary the artillery's target is the more accurate its fire would be on that target. In short, moving targets are harder to hit than stationary targets.
Guns should be abandoned on the field from time to time due to insufficient horses to move them.
Men should not be able to push guns all over the map, (woods/hills), especially when the men are exhausted.
Limbered confederate guns should not be able to travel as fast/far on the double quick as union guns as they had 4 horses pulling each gun, the union had 6.
It should be almost impossible to move guns through the thick woods, limbered or otherwise. Moving a gun through light woods should at least be slower than infantry.
It would be nice to have some random events generated for artillery to simulate the mechanical failures these men had to deal with. These events would either temporarily or permanently disable a gun.
If a limbered gun lost one of its horses pulling it, due to injury or enemy fire, then the gun had to be stopped and the horse cut out of its reins before the gun could be moved again.
Concerning the taking of guns, I have found in the literature the use of the skirmish formation and sharpshooters to aid in this process.
An abandoned gun could taken and moved but not fired as the limber and caisson would have left. Also the equipment needed to service the gun would not have been carried by infantry or cavalry. It would take about 15-20 men to get it back to your line.
Capture of a limbered battery is a different story. But remember that this would be the first time using the gun and in think that the men being regular infantry would be very slow and poor shots. I think what more likely happened was that artillery crews were run off the guns and they remained in control of the unit that captured them but were not serviced. Rather they were taken to the rear.
It think it would be feasible to attach a captured gun to an existing artillery unit once it was brought there and it would be serviced by the trained men of that artillery unit’s reserves. It could be limbered and moved by the reserve horses and limbers of that battery. This new gun would function on a moderately good level.
Finally, and I really mean it this time. I don’t think that the effect of moral has been considered enough. Infantry supported by artillery must have felt significantly better about their situation. If I was in the line, I would want a grand battery behind me. Any infantry units supported by artillery should receive a very significant moral bonus so long as those guns are firing at the enemy to their front. Conversely, the opposite should be true. Attacking troops should be hit with a significant moral loss as they near infantry that is supported by artillery, given equal numbers. It should be very difficult to get a brigade to attack another brigade supported by 4 artillery batteries with any kind of enthusiasm unless supported significantly in other ways.
Infantry advancing in the face of artillery fire should also loose some of their ability to fire accurately. All the flying debris, rocks, dirt and metal, not to mention the concussions, would cause considerable flinching, ducking and blinking making firing a rifle accurately a very difficult task indeed.
That is it gentlemen. I’m sure I forgot something. I apologize for the length of the post. Norb and team do with this as you wish, I hope it proves useful to you efforts which I greatly appreciate.
Regards,
Greg
